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

GRANT'S CAMPAIGN  
IN VIRGINIA

MAY 1—JUNE 30, 1864

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J. H. ANDERSON

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**GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN  
VIRGINIA**





# GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA

MAY 1—JUNE 30, 1864

INCLUDING THE OPERATIONS IN THE  
SHENANDOAH VALLEY AND ON  
THE RIVER JAMES

BY

J. H. ANDERSON, F.R.HIST.SOC.

BARRISTER-AT-LAW; LATE LECTURER AT KING'S COLL., LONDON; SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE  
IN INDIAN CIVIL, AND HOME CIVIL (CLASS I.) EXAMINATIONS; LECTURER ON  
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## PREFACE

**T**HIS little volume deals with the operations of General Grant in Virginia, May 3 to June 30, 1864, including movements on the River James and in the Shenandoah Valley. This period is prescribed for the Promotion Examinations of November 1908, and May 1909, and for the Staff College Examination of August 1909. In the case of the Promotion, a Special Period is added, viz. May 19 to June 12.

I add a list of authorities, but I wish particularly to emphasize my obligations to Gen. A. A. Humphreys' book on 1864 and 1865, and to his maps I have referred students, *e.g.* Map A, etc. I have printed the Confederate officers in italics, and I urge that in tactics the line should be drawn at Divisions.

### LIST OF AUTHORITIES

W. Swinton, "Army of the Potomac."

G. A. Pond, "Shenandoah Valley."

Wood and Edmonds, "The Civil War."

Henderson, "Lecture on the Wilderness."

Bigelow, "Strategy."

Alexander, "Memoirs of a Confederate."

Long, "Life of Lee."

Badeau, "Life of Grant."

"Battles and Leaders of the Civil War."

Anderson, "Stonewall Jackson."

"Papers of the Military Historical Society of  
Massachusetts."

The Maps at the Royal United Service Institu-  
tion, to which I have been kindly allowed  
access.

Vaughan-Sawyer, "1864 in Virginia."

C. F. Atkinson, "Grant's Campaign in Virginia."

Col. Edmonds' suggestive Notes in *B. E.*  
*Journal*, July, 1908.

N.B. (1) I strongly recommend the study of Gen.  
Humphreys' book.

(2) Roman figures indicate Federals, Arabic  
figures Confederates.

## LIST OF DATES

1864. May 4-6. Federal passage of the Rapidan.  
May 4. *Lee* moved on the Wilderness.  
May 5-7. Battle of the Wilderness.  
May 6. Butler at Bermuda Hundred.  
May 7. Federal movement on Spottsylvania.  
*Lee's* movement on Spottsylvania.  
May 8-19. Battle of Spottsylvania.  
May 8-24. Sheridan's raid to the James (Richmond Raid).  
May 11. *Stuart's* death at Yellow Tavern.  
May 15. Battle of Newmarket.  
May 16. Battle of Drury's Bluff.  
May 20. Federal move to the N. Anna.  
May 22. *Lee* on the N. Anna.  
May 24-26. The Armies on the N. Anna.  
May 26. Federal movement to the Totopotomoy.  
May 27. *Lee* to the Totopotomoy.  
May 27-31. The Armies on the Totopotomoy.

## LIST OF DATES

1864. June 1-12. The Armies at Cold Harbour.  
June 3. Battle of Cold Harbour.  
June 5. Battle of Piedmont.  
June 7-21. Sheridan's raid west (Trevylian Station).  
June 9. Butler attacked Petersburg.  
June 11. Combat of Trevylian Station.  
June 12. Grant moved to cross the Chickahominy and the James.  
June 13. *Lee* crossed the Chickahominy.  
June 14-16. Federal passage of the James.  
June 15-18. Federal assaults on Petersburg.  
June 18. *Lee* at Petersburg.  
June 18. Hunter repulsed at Lynchburg.  
June 22-July 2. Wilson's raid.
-

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# Grant's Campaign in Virginia

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

**T**HE Civil War, or War of Secession in the United States, 1861-5, was unique amongst the wars of the nineteenth century—a civil war of gigantic proportions on a theatre of immense extent, marked by fearful bloodshed, and attended by innovations—ironclads, torpedoes, railways, breech-loaders, telegraphs—and in it the whole people learned the trade of war. In 1861 the United States had 17,000 soldiers; but in five years the North had put under arms 2,500,000, and the South 600,000, and the losses were 300,000 and 200,000 respectively. Great generals arose—McClellan, Grant, Sherman, *Lee*, *Johnston*, *Jackson*.

The Northern or Federal States (Stars and Stripes) were separated from the Southern or Confederate States (Stars and Bars) by the imaginary Mason and Dixon's line; the South, numbering 6,000,000 whites, included the Caro-<sup>Any</sup>linas, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, <sup>Atlas.</sup>

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Louisiana, Texas, Tennessee, Arkansas, East Virginia; the North, numbering 20,000,000 whites, included the northern and north-eastern States, *e.g.* Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, West Virginia, and in the west, California and Oregon. Doubtful States were Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri.

### THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

The following operations occurred in Virginia and West Virginia; Virginia included the Valley of the Shenandoah and the plain lying east of the Blue Ridge. In this plain the roads were bad, swamps and forests not rare, *e.g.* the Wilderness; food was scarce, and the rivers formidable obstacles, *e.g.* Rapidan, North Anna, South Anna, Pamunkey and James. For all these reasons the railways were of supreme importance, and the chief ones were (1) Baltimore and Ohio, connecting Washington with the west; (2) Orange and Alexandria, running south-west from Washington; (3) the Richmond railways to Fredericksburg northwards, to Gordonsville and westwards, to Weldon, to Danville, and to Lynchburg.

The Shenandoah Valley lay west of the Blue Ridge, with a turnpike passing through it northwards from Staunton. This district afforded large supplies to the Confederates, and had on more than one occasion been the scene of Federal

Map A in  
Humphreys.

Any  
Atlas.

Map A in  
Humphreys.

disaster, for down it the Southern troops could always aim a blow at Washington.

N.B.—Washington to Richmond was one hundred miles; the Federal maps were bad; Richmond was a political capital, a commercial centre, an ordnance dépôt, a river port and a railway centre; but it depended on the retention of Petersburg.

## CHAPTER II

### *THE ARMIES*

**FEDERALS:** Lieut-Gen. Grant commanded all the Federal forces, and fortunately for them the President had learnt the wisdom of not interfering with the Commander-in-chief, who arrived at Brandy station, the Headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, because in Virginia lay the real issue, and because there he could check any unwise political interference from Washington. He gave only general instructions to Gen. Meade, and left the execution to that officer.

#### ARMIES OF THE FEDERALS

(1) Army of the Potomac under Gen. Meade, with Gen. Humphreys as Chief of Staff.

II. Corps under Gen. Hancock, and after June 21 under Gen. Birney :

It included four Divisions, under Barlow, Gibbon, Birney, and Mott. On May 15 Mott's Division was reduced to a brigade, and added to Birney's Division, but a new Division under

Tyler at once raised the Corps to its normal strength. Guns, 54.

V. Corps under Gen. Warren :

It included four Divisions, under Griffin, Robinson, Crawford and Wadsworth. On May 8 Cutler replaced Wadsworth, and Robinson's Division was broken up. Guns, 48.

VI. Corps under Gen. Sedgwick, and after May 9 under Gen. Wright :

It included three Divisions, under Wright, Getty and Ricketts. Guns, 48.

IX. Corps under Gen. Burnside :

It included four Divisions, under Stevenson, Potter, Willcox, and Ferrero—the last of negroes. On May 10 Crittenden replaced Stevenson. Guns, 42. This corps united with the others on May 8, but as Burnside was higher in rank than Meade, it was not incorporated with the Army of the Potomac till May 24; it consisted of recruits, in accordance with the unwise system of raising new units instead of filling up the old organisations.

Cavalry Corps under Gen. Sheridan :

It included three Divisions, under Torbert, Gregg and Wilson. Guns, 32.

Artillery Reserve, under Gen. Hunt. Guns, 92.

Each Corps averaged 24,000 men, and the total of

## 18 GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA

the above forces ran up to 92,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and 316 guns. The numbers are always uncertain.

There had been a First and a Third Corps in the Army of the Potomac, but owing to their reduced strength they had been merged into the other Corps; as a fact this damaged *esprit de corps*, and in the fighting that ensued six small Corps would have been more manageable than four large ones—*e.g.* in the second day's fighting in the Wilderness, Hancock was so extended that he had to give independent commands to Birney and Gibbon.

(2) Army of the Shenandoah under Gen. Sigel and under Gen. Hunter; it numbered 15,000 men and 40 guns.

(3) Army of West Virginia, under Crook and Averell; it numbered 9,000 men and 24 guns.

(4) Army of the James, under Gen. Butler.

X. Corps under Gen. Gillmore :

It included three Divisions, under Terry, Turner and Ames, and numbered 17,000 men with 44 guns and 2 siege howitzers.

XVIII. Corps under Gen. Smith :

It included three Divisions, under Brooks, Weitzel and Hinks—the last of negroes—and numbered 15,000 men with 36 guns; besides

3,000 cavalry with six guns under Gen. Kautz, and 1,800 negro cavalry under Col. West.

(5) At Washington were 40,000 reserves.

The Grand Total of Grant's forces in the Virginia theatre amounted to 205,000 men and 468 guns.

#### ARMIES OF THE CONFEDERATES

Commander-in-Chief, *President Davis*, who controlled the general strategy of the war.

(1) Army of Northern Virginia, under *Gen. Lee*.

1st Corps, under *Gen. Longstreet*, and after May 6 under *Gen. R. H. Anderson*:

It included three Divisions, under *Field*, *Kershaw* and *Pickett*: this last Division, 5,000 strong, was at first south of the James. Guns, 54.

2nd Corps, under *Gen. Ewell* and after May 27 under *Gen. Early*:

It included three Divisions, under *Early*, *Johnson*, and *Rodes*. On May 8 *Gordon* replaced *Early* until May 22, when *Early* resumed his Division, and *Gordon* then replaced *Johnson*. Guns, 70.

3rd Corps, under *Gen. A. P. Hill*, and from May 8 to May 22 under *Gen. Early*, *Gen. Hill* resuming on the latter date:



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It included three Divisions: under *Anderson*, *Heth*, and *Wilcox*. On May 8 *Mahone* replaced *Anderson*. Guns, 80.

Cavalry Corps, under *Gen. J. E. B. Stuart*:

It included two Divisions, under *Hampton* and *Fitzhugh Lee*. Guns, 20.

Each Infantry Corps averaged 16,000, and the total of the Army of Northern Virginia seems to be 62,000 men, including 8,000 horse and 224 guns. This total apparently includes *Pickett's* Division, which did not join *Lee* till June 1.

(2) Army of the Shenandoah Valley, under *Breckinridge*:

This numbered 9,000 men and 24 guns. Towards the end of our period this Army—then of four brigades—passed under *Early*.

(3) Army of *Gen. Beauregard* near Petersburg:

It numbered 22,000 infantry—including *Pickett*—2,000 cavalry and 50 guns.

The grand total of *Lee's* forces in the Virginia theatre amounted to 90,000 men with 298 guns; but Confederate numbers are always uncertain.

In both armies the Divisions ran about 5,000 to 8,000, and Brigades about 1,500 to 3,000.

At the opening of 1864 the North was depressed, the war costing nearly £800,000 a day, and gold rising from 168 in May to 285 in July: the Pre-

sidential election was at hand, and recruits could be secured only by giving bounties of £200. The Southerners, more enthusiastic, enlisted freely, and being all natives, without the large admixture of foreigners who flocked to the Federal standards, formed better fighting material. The troops on both sides were really volunteers, and had to be treated as such. The Federals were splendidly clothed and fed—a complete contrast to the wretchedly supplied Southerners. There was not much to choose between the Infantry on both sides, whose muzzle-loading rifles were effective at 250 yards. The Southern cavalry were naturally superior, and their leader was far abler than the infantry general, Sheridan; but, unluckily for them, they had only muzzle-loaders, whereas Sheridan's men carried magazine-carbines, and all the cavalry fought much on foot, indeed on both sides it was mounted infantry, carrying revolvers, rifles, carbines, but no swords, bayonets or lances. The rifled artillery was effective at 2,000 yards, but in this arm the Confederates were at a disadvantage.

The Boer War has caused many to think that the armed farmer is a match for the trained regular, but Lord Wolseley holds that one trained army corps would, at least in 1861, have settled the question. On the march volunteers may equal regulars, but it is in military house-keeping and in action, and, indeed, in offensive

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operations generally, that the regular is seen to excel the armed patriot. Callwell, in his *Small Wars*, states that only in two modern instances have guerillas proved more than a match for regular troops—namely, the Cuban insurgents beat the Spaniards, and the Abyssinians at Adowa defeated the Italians.

## CHAPTER III

### *ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONS*

IN May 1864 three Federal armies were moving on Richmond—Sigel up the Shenandoah Valley, Grant along the Orange railway, and Butler up the River James. *Breckinridge, Lee* and *Beauregard* opposed them.

*Lee* lay behind the Rapidan, N.E. of Orange Court House, and Grant during May 4—6 made flank march No. 1 by his left over at Germanna Ford into the Wilderness; *Lee* replied by moving along the Orange Pike and Orange Plank roads and by attacking Grant's Army of the Potomac in the Battle of the Wilderness, May 5—7; in this battle Grant's numbers (104,000 *v.* 57,000) would have defeated *Lee*, but for the slowness of Burnside, and but for the Federals' apprehension that *Longstreet* would strike them on their left near Trigg's. The result was indecisive.

### THE BATTLE

At night II. Corps at Chancellorsville, V. Corps May 4. at Wilderness Tavern, VI. in rear, IX. Corps

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on Germanna Ford; as to *Lee*, *Ewell* on the Pike west of the Tavern, *Hill* on the Plank road west of Parker's, *Longstreet* and *Anderson* marching to *Hill*.

May 5.  
Plan 1.

Warren's V. Corps advancing on Parker's struck *Ewell*, and consequently Hancock's II. Corps was recalled from its march on Shady Grove Church and directed to Parker's. Part of the VI. Corps arrived to strengthen Warren's right in his conflict with *Ewell*, whilst part of the VI. Corps with the II. Corps formed along the Brock road facing *Hill*. At 4.15 p.m. a terrific attack was delivered against *Hill* by the II. Corps and part of the VI. Corps, darkness alone saving the Confederate.

May 6.  
Hancock's  
First  
Attack.  
Plan 2.

At 5 a.m. Hancock with the II. Corps, part of the VI. and part of the V., fell on *Hill* along the Plank road with great effect; but at 6.30 a.m. *Longstreet* and *Anderson* arrived, and Hancock was at once checked.

Han-  
cock's  
Second  
Attack.

At 9 a.m. Hancock again attacked *Hill* without much success; and at 11 a.m. came *Longstreet's* counter-attack from the unfinished railway on Hancock's left. It might have resulted in a total defeat of the Federals, but for *Longstreet's* accidental wound. *Lee* in person postponed the assault. Meantime on the Federal right the V. and VI. Corps withstood *Ewell*.

At 2 p.m. the anxiously awaited assault of Burnside's IX. Corps took place in the Federal

centre, north of the Plank road, on *Hill* and *Longstreet*—it produced little effect.

At 4.15 p.m. *Lee* with troops of *Longstreet* and *Hill* fiercely engaged *Hancock*, south of the Plank road, but was repulsed; and the day's fighting closed with a successful surprise-attack by part of *Ewell* against the right of the VI. Corps, north of the Pike. During all the battle *Sheridan* was contending with *Stuart* on the Federal left near *Todd's Tavern*.

On May 8, *Sheridan* with most of the cavalry started on his Richmond raid to the River James, in the course of which he defeated and killed *Stuart* at *Yellow Tavern*, May 11.

On May 7 *Grant* made flank march No. 2 on *Spottsylvania Court House*—V. Corps by the *Brock road*, VI. Corps *via* *Chancellorsville* and the *Piney Branch Church road*, II. Corps to follow the V. Corps, and the IX. Corps to follow the VI. Corps. This move to the *Court House* was forestalled by *Lee* with *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry and with *Anderson's* (vice *Longstreet*) Corps. This led to the *Battle of Spottsylvania Court House*, May 8—19: the V. Corps and the VI. Corps vainly assailed *Anderson* and *Ewell* along the *Brock road*. Both sides (as at the *Wilderness*) entrenched.

*Early* (commanding *Hill's* corps) arrived at the *Court House* on *Lee's* right, *Ewell* being in the centre, *Anderson* on the left. *Hancock's* II.

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Corps *via* the Brock road formed on the Federal right, Burnside's IX. Corps on the left, the V. and VI. Corps being in the centre. On this day Hancock passed to the south of the River Po, and to meet him *Lee* despatched part of *Early* from his right.

May 10. Hancock, attacked by *Early*, was recalled by Grant to the north bank of the Po, and at 3.45 p.m. Warren's V. Corps attacked *Anderson* without effect, as also did Hancock later on. At 6 p.m. Col. Upton of the VI. Corps made his celebrated assault on the "Bloody Angle," which assault being unsupported failed.

May 11. Grant at night executed flank march No. 3 by moving the II. Corps to his left, which corps at 4.30 a.m. carried the Confederate salient in spite of *Ewell*; but then came *Gordon's* division of *Ewell* in a fierce counter-attack, and in the end Hancock clung only to the outer face of the hostile entrenchments, over which his corps and part of the VI. Corps savagely contended with *Ewell's* troops till 3 a.m. on the 13th. Meantime on the Federal left the IX. Corps vainly assailed *Early's* works, and on the Federal right the V. Corps failed against *Anderson*.

May 13. *Lee* abandoned the salient, and fell back to a new entrenchment across the base of the salient; and Grant made flank march No. 4 by moving his V. Corps and VI. Corps from the right to the left.

## ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONS 27

*Lee* transferred *Anderson's* corps to his right, which finally reached to Snell's bridge. May 14,  
Plan 5.

Both sides strengthened their entrenchments. May 15,  
16, 17.

Grant, thinking that *Lee* had depleted his left, *i.e.* the new entrenchments across the base of the salient, executed flank move No. 5 by moving the VI. Corps from the left to the right; that Corps, the II. Corps and the IX. Corps then attacked *Ewell*, who however was in full strength. The VI. Corps returned to its original position. May 18.

*Ewell* moved out in force to Harris's on the Fredericksburg road, whence he was driven back by the arrival of the II. Corps and V. Corps. May 19.

Meantime Gen. Butler with the Army of the James—X. Corps under Gillmore and XVIII. Corps under Smith—had on May 6 landed at Bermuda Hundred and entrenched. He was opposed by *Beauregard*, who on May 16 beat him at Drury's Bluff and shut him up in his entrenchments at Bermuda Hundred in spite of his superior numbers. Grant at once ordered Butler to ship half his force under Smith to White House to join the main army, whilst *Beauregard* despatched *Pickett's* Division and *Hoke's* Division to reinforce *Lee*.

On May 20 Grant made flank move No. 6 toward the N. Anna, the II. Corps going first *via* Guinea Station and Milford Bridge. The other three corps followed. *Lee* however outmanœuvred his opponent, and hurrying along the Telegraph



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Plan 6. road reached Hanover Junction, and entrenched south of the N. Anna, being here joined by *Breckinridge* from the Valley and by *Pickett* from Beaugard. Grant also entrenched, his wings south of the river, II. Corps and one division of IX. Corps on the left, V. Corps, VI. Corps and one division of IX. Corps on the right, his centre (one division of IX. Corps) north of the river at Oxford. The armies stopped in these positions May 24-6, Sheridan rejoining Grant.

Plan 7. On May 26 Grant began flank move No. 7, down the east bank of the Pamunkey to Hanover Town, preceded by Sheridan's cavalry. *Lee* at once moved *Ewell's* corps under *Early* into position between the Totopotomoy and Bethesda Church, *Anderson's* corps on *Early's* right, on *Early's* left *Breckinridge*, and on his left *Hill's* corps in front of Atlee's Station. In fact, *Lee* stood in Grant's way.

The Federals then crossed the Pamunkey, and on May 30 brought on the Action of Totopotomoy. In it the VI. Corps on the right was so delayed by the swamps of Crump's Creek that it could do little; the II. Corps crossing the Totopotomoy demonstrated against *Hill* and *Breckinridge*; the IX. Corps near Whitlock's fronted *Early*; the V. Corps moved along the Shady Grove Church road against *Early*, who sent a division *via* Bethesda Church to fall on the V. Corps' left.

## ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONS 29

This led to severe fighting, and to help Warren (V. Corps) Hancock (II. Corps) fiercely assailed *Breckinridge*. This day Smith's XVIII. Corps from Butler reached White House, and on May 31 marched into Old Church.

On May 30 at night V. Corps lay between Shady Grove and Old Church roads, left on Bethesda Church; IX. Corps near Whitlock's to the northwest of V. Corps; II. Corps on right of IX. Corps, south of Totopotomoy Creek; VI. Corps in rear of II. Corps, west of Hawes's. *Lee* was opposite from Atlee's Station to Old Church road. This day *Hoke's* division reached *Lee* from Beau regard.

On May 31 Sheridan's cavalry seized Old Cold Harbour, and on June 1—2 Grant made flank June 1. march No. 8 to that place. The VI. Corps arrived there first, *Lee* replying by moving *Anderson* and *Hoke* down to his right; next came Smith's XVIII. Corps to the right, between the VI. and V. Corps. The XVIII. and VI. Corps successfully assailed *Anderson* and *Hoke*, to help whom *Lee* with *Hill*, *Breckinridge* and *Early* attacked the three other Federal corps.

Very early Hancock (II. Corps) marched to June 2. the left of Wright's VI. Corps. *Lee* replied by Plan 8. moving men to his right, and he stood thus from the left—*Heth's* division, *Early*, *Anderson*, *Hoke's* division, *Breckinridge's* division, *Hill*. Grant on his side moved IX. Corps to the right

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rear of the V. Corps. *Heth* and *Early* at once assailed the right flank of the V. Corps, but were repulsed by the IX. Corps. Grant then stretched from Bethesda Church to the Chickahominy.

June 3. Sheridan crossed that river, and was faced by the Southern cavalry. Grant foolishly delivered a frontal attack in the Battle of Cold Harbour.

At 4.30 a.m. II., VI., XVIII. Corps attacked most vigorously, but could not carry *Lee's* main position. The V. and IX. Corps also assailed *Heth* and *Early*. Grant then suspended the action. From June 3 to June 12 the armies faced each other. At this time Sheridan went off on a raid, in which he fought the action of Trevilian Station on June 11 with the Confederates *Hampton* and *Fitzhugh Lee*, who had been dispatched after him, whilst *Lee* sent *Breckinridge* and *Early* to check Hunter in the valley.

On June 12 Grant began flank move No. 9, and by the 16th the Army of the Potomac had secretly crossed the Chickahominy and the James, a fact which *Lee* refused to credit till June 17. The Federals then assaulted the eastern front of the Petersburg entrenchments June 15—18; but *Lee* arrived in time to save the city, and the operations closed with a raid by Wilson's cavalry against the Danville railway.

In the Valley Gen. Sigel was beaten by

## ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONS 31

*Breckinridge* at Newmarket, May 15, but Hunter succeeding Sigel beat a Confederate force at Piedmont, June 5. *Lee* at once returned *Breckinridge* and sent *Early* to the Valley, and they drove Hunter from Lynchburg westwards into West Virginia, and then began to move down the Valley.

## CHAPTER IV

### *POSITIONS AND PLANS*

**T**HE Federals had four Armies, and in the James Admiral Lee's fleet:—Army of the Potomac and IX. Corps near Culpeper, with *Lee's* Army as the primary objective; Sigel in the Valley to move southwards on Staunton, unite there with Crook and Averell from West Virginia, then on Lynchburg, and thence join the Army of the Potomac; Butler at Yorktown to march south of the James on Richmond, assisted by the fleet. Grant with the Army of the Potomac may be regarded as the centre, Sigel as the right and Butler as the left.

Any  
Atlas.

Grant's original idea had been to force *Lee* back on Richmond, cut the Richmond railways, cross the James west of the city, and join Butler. *Lee* frustrated this plan, and Grant had to manœuvre eastwards, his general notion being to draw the Southern general out of his entrenchments and thus fight him on equal terms; he failed because *Lee* was always entrenched.

Early in 1864 the Army of the Potomac and

IX. Corps lay near Culpeper, with infantry posts and vedettes well in front, and with the railway from Washington bringing supplies. *Lee* lay entrenched for twenty miles behind the Rapidan, from Barnett's Ford to Morton's Ford. *Hill's* 3rd Corps on the left, *Ewell's* 2nd Corps on the right, cavalry mostly along the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, where forage could be got. On his right he had a return entrenchment up the Mine Run to Antioch Church, and headquarters at Orange Court House, seventy miles from Richmond. On the left rear at Gordonsville stood *Longstreet's* 1st Corps with two Divisions (Gen. Meade supposed that he had three).

On April 9 Gen. Grant issued instructions to Meade, sketching the plan previously stated, merely adding that Sigel would break all railways possible. Grant had next to decide how to deal with *Lee*. (1) To attack the centre was hopeless; (2) To turn *Lee's* left, the railway would be a help: the country was open and cultivated, but the protection of the railway would consume many men, the wounded would fill many trains, and the Federals must come on South-west Mountain—between Charlottesville and Gordonsville, north-west of railway—which *Lee* would have entrenched; (3) To turn *Lee's* right, Grant must resign the railway, the supply would be difficult, the train immense (5,000 wagons), the Wilderness possessing few farms, a dense forest full of undergrowth,

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unsuitable for large numbers and for artillery, would assist the defender. Besides, *Lee's* officers on Clark's Mount, on the Rapidan just east of railway, would detect the move, and the Confederates were familiar with the forest roads. On the other hand, there would be water communication, and Grant wisely decided to take this line, his object being to fight *Lee* in the open, or by cutting in between him and Richmond to compel the Southerner to attack—*i.e.* strategic offensive and tactical defensive. Grant's eastward move was strategically sound, tactically disadvantageous, because it led him into a difficult region.

### FEDERAL PASSAGE OF THE RAPIDAN

Grant's  
first flank  
move.

Map B in  
Hum-  
phreys.

On May 2 the order was given, and the Army of the Potomac started at midnight of May 3, Sheridan with two Cavalry Divisions leading, whilst Torbert's Cavalry Division covered the rear. Over the Rapidan, which was 200 feet wide, two bridges were thrown at Germanna Ford, two at Ely's Ford, and one at Culpeper Mine Ford. By Ely's Ford Gregg's Cavalry Division, II. Corps, Reserve Artillery crossed to Chancellorsville, and by Germanna Ford Wilson's Cavalry Division, V. and VI. Corps to Wilderness Tavern. The trains, except the fighting trains, passed at Culpeper Mine Ford and Ely's Ford, covered by cavalry and some infantry. Gregg moved to Piney Branch Church reconnoitring, as did Wilson towards Parker's Store.

During May 4 II. Corps reached Chancellorsville, V. Corps Wilderness Tavern, with VI. Corps in rear. This march of twenty miles was well executed. At 1.15 p.m. Grant ordered the IX. Corps on Germanna Ford, where the whole corps crossed by the morning of May 6. Signs of the enemy were seen along the Plank road from Orange Court House to New Verdiersville, and Sheridan having heard that Stuart was near Hamilton's Crossing, was directed to proceed on May 5 against him, with Gregg and Torbert; Wilson's Cavalry Division to Craig's Meeting-house on the Catharpin road, Hancock's II. Corps to Shady Grove Church on the same road, Warren's V. Corps to Parker's Store, Sedgwick's VI. Corps to Wilderness Tavern.

On the same date, May 4, *Lee*, ascertaining the Federal movements, sent *Ewell* towards Locust Grove (Robertson's Tavern) on the Orange Pike, and *A. P. Hill* with two Divisions, *Heth* and *Wilcox*, along the Orange Plank road on New Verdiersville, *Anderson's* Division on the Rapidan not joining *Hill* until May 6. *Longstreet* lost his way on the march from Gordonsville *via* Brock's Bridge, and did not reach a point on the Catharpin road just west of Craig's Meeting-house till the night of the 5th, but on his right *Lee* succeeded in drawing in *Stuart's* horsemen.



## CHAPTER V

### *THE BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS, MAY 5—7*

Map B in  
Humphreys. THIS battle was fought in a dense forest, and on disused tobacco-fields; and the numbers were on *Lee's* side 57,000 with 224 guns, and on Grant's side 104,000 with 316 guns; but neither artillery nor cavalry was of much use.

"The ground was intersected by rivulets, ravines, and ridges of mineral rock. Excavations had been made in opening iron-ore beds, leaving pits bordered by ridges of earth" (Porter).

Plan 1. On May 5 *Ewell* moved along the Pike, halting two miles from Wilderness Tavern; Warren's V. Corps moved towards Parker's in this order—Crawford, Wadsworth, Robinson, Griffin—and they reported at 7.15 a.m. hostile infantry (*Ewell's*) on the Pike, west of the Tavern. Meade ordered Warren to attack northwards, and Hancock's II.

Map A in  
Humphreys. Corps to halt just beyond Todd's Tavern, and Sedwick's VI. Corps to march along the road that leaves the Germanna Plank road at Spottswood, attack and connect with Warren. Sedgwick had one Division and two Brigades.

## BATTLE OF WILDERNESS, MAY 5-7 37

Crawford of Warren's V. Corps, moving on Chewning's Farm, came on a cavalry detachment left by Gen. Wilson, and found it skirmishing with the enemy. At 8 a.m. Crawford halted at Chewning's, and became engaged with the flanks of the advanced guard of *Hill's* 3rd Corps.

At 9.30 a.m. the Confederates appeared so strong that Hancock's II. Corps was called up along the Brock road into the Orange Plank road, and at the same time Getty of Sedgwick's VI. Corps was directed *via* Wilderness Tavern to the intersection of Brock and Orange Plank roads.

*Ewell* (2nd Corps) was on the Pike, with his three divisions deployed on either side of it, when at noon Griffin of Warren's V. Corps, working up through the woods, struck him in front. But Sedgwick, checked by the undergrowth, could not connect with Griffin's right, and so that officer had to retire south of the Pike, the Confederates following, capturing two of his guns and entrenching themselves.

Meantime Wadsworth and Robinson of Warren's V. Corps, passing through dense thicket, came on *Ewell's* right, and were so roughly handled that they also had to retire. Crawford being now isolated, was drawn in at 2 p.m., and posted one mile S.W. of the Lacy House, facing towards Chewnings. He formed the left of Warren, who stretched north-westwards till his right rested on the Pike, 300 yards from the hostile line. *Ewell*

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lay across the Pike—*Rodes* south of it, *Johnson* and *Early* north of it, all strongly entrenched.

At 2.30 p.m. Sedgwick's VI. Corps, *i.e.* Wright's Division, one brigade of Getty, and one brigade of Ricketts, came up within 300 yards of *Johnson* and *Early*, north of the Pike, on which it connected with Warren's V. Corps. The woods in front were blazing. *Ewell*, with 17,000, was then facing 24,000 of Warren and 12,000 of Sedgwick, and Grant had a great chance to destroy *Ewell* before *Longstreet* could arrive.


Meantime, at 11 a.m., Getty of Sedgwick's VI. Corps, reaching the intersection of the Brock and Orange Plank roads, skirmished with *Hill* on the latter road. He tried to connect with Warren's left, and entrenched with the intention of waiting for Hancock.

*Hill* and *Ewell* were told that *Lee* did not want a general engagement till *Longstreet* should arrive; but that general was excessively slow. *Hill* formed *Heth's* Division across the Orange Plank road behind the swamps of the Ny on the south, and of the Wilderness Run on the north, with his guns on an eminence near Tapp's. Behind *Heth* came *Wilcox*, who at 2 p.m. moved *vid* *Chewning's* in order to connect with *Ewell's* right, but at 5 p.m. was recalled to support *Heth*.


Hancock had orders to close up to Getty's Division of Sedgwick's VI. Corps, and with him to drive back *Hill*, and to connect with Warren's

SKETCH OF  
WILDERNESS

Map of May 5.



■ Wilderness  
Tavern



■  
Todd's

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## BATTLE OF WILDERNESS, MAY 5-7 39

left. At 3.15 p.m. Getty and Hancock were directed to attack, *Longstreet* not being expected till next day. Sedgwick and Warren would also attack at the same time. Ricketts's other brigade having handed over the Germanna bridge to Burnside's IX. Corps, was brought up behind the right of Warren and the left of Sedgwick.

Hancock from Todd's Tavern, moving along the Brock road, joined Getty's left at 2 p.m., the left of Hancock occupying high, clear ground in advance of the Brock road towards the Orange and Fredericksburg unfinished railway, with the extreme left refused. There also was posted most of Hancock's artillery. The II. Corps threw up breastworks because Getty informed Hancock that *Hill* had in front two divisions—as a fact he had just then only one, *i.e.* *Heth*. This delay gave *Hill* time, which he wanted, having only 14,000 in his two divisions against 38,000. At 4.15 p.m. Getty moved through the forest against *Heth*. Hancock therefore ordered Birney—commanding his own division and Mott's—to support him. Birney's division moved on Getty's right, and Mott's on Getty's left. The fighting was fierce. Two brigades of Gibbon of Hancock's II. Corps supported Getty, and luckily for *Hill* darkness at 8 p.m. stopped the action; for his division under *Anderson* and *Longstreet's* 1st Corps were still far off. On Hancock's left Barlow's Division was engaged with *Hill's* right; but

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Barlow did little, because he was held back in consequence of a rumour that *Pickett's* Division had arrived, and would attack *via* the unfinished railway.

At 4.30 p.m. Warren despatched Wadsworth and a brigade south-eastwards to strike the left of *Hill*; the woods impeded them, and as darkness came on they halted for the night facing south-east, their left about half a mile from the Brock road. Soon after Getty attacked, *i.e.* about 5 p.m., *Hill* recalled *Wilcox* from *Ewell's* right, and used him to support *Heth*.

All this time on the Federal right heavy skirmishing took place between *Early's* Division of *Ewell's* Corps, and the troops of Sedgwick's VI. Corps, *i.e.* *Wright's* Division, one brigade of *Ricketts*, and one brigade of *Getty*.

The work of the cavalry may be thus summarised:—Early on May 5 *Wilson*, leaving at *Parker's* a detachment, which *Hill* drove in, moved on *Craig's* Meeting-house, where he met part of *Stuart's* horse under *Hampton*; finally the Federal Cavalry Division retired on *Todd's* Tavern, where it joined *Gregg's* Cavalry Division. *Sheridan* himself, reconnoitring towards *Hamilton's* Crossing, had found that *Stuart* had been called in to *Lee's* right, and had to content himself with protecting the huge Army trains.

May 6. Grant had no chance of crushing *Lee* because  
Plan 2. *Longstreet* arrived, and *Lee* had no chance of

## BATTLE OF WILDERNESS, MAY 5-7 41

beating Grant because Burnside arrived. During the early morning *Hill* and *Ewell* strengthened their entrenchments, and at dawn *Longstreet* reached Parker's to relieve *Hill*, who was also reinforced by *Anderson's* Division, *via* New Verdiersville. On the Federal side Grant ordered Hancock, Warren, Sedgwick to attack at 5 a.m.; and Burnside from Germanna Ford was to start at 2 a.m. with three of his four divisions, put one at Wilderness Tavern in reserve, with the two others fill up the gap between Hancock and Warren, and then, moving on Chewning's, sever *Hill* from *Ewell*.

At 5 a.m., on the Federal right, Wright's Division of Sedgwick's VI. Corps, and in the Federal centre Warren attacked *Ewell*, but without success. Prisoners said that *Longstreet* would fall on the Federal left *via* the road debouching from the south at Trigg's, and so Gen. Gibbon was put in control of Hancock's left, *i.e.* his own and Barlow's Divisions, whilst Gen. Birney was put in control of Hancock's right, *i.e.* his own and Mott's Divisions, both of II. Corps, and Getty's of VI. Corps. As a fact, *Longstreet* came at dawn *via* Parker's, to support *Hill*. At 5 a.m. Birney's command with Wadsworth of Warren on its right severely assailed *Hill* along the Plank road and broke his front; but just then, 6.30 a.m., *Longstreet*, with two divisions and *Anderson* of *Hill* came up and checked the Federals, now disordered by fighting, by the forest, and the swamp.



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Meade, learning of *Longstreet's* arrival, ordered Sedgwick and Warren to press on, and Sheridan's cavalry to fall on *Longstreet's* flank *via* the Brock road. The three brigades of Gibbon's Division (of Hancock's Corps) supported Birney, whilst Getty of Sedgwick, having suffered heavily, retired to the Brock road. At 6.30 a.m., Hancock requested Meade to hurry on Burnside's anxiously awaited operation; but even at 11.45 a.m. we find Gen. Rawlins, Grant's Chief of Staff, writing to him: "Push on. Hancock has been waiting for you for three hours."

7 a.m. Hancock ordered Gibbon to attack the enemy's right with Barlow's Division. This order was only partially executed, because Gibbon feared *Longstreet* might fall on him from the south and as a fact, (1) at 7.30 a.m. some infantry did appear on the south on Gibbon's left, but they were Federal convalescents rejoining the army; (2) some troops appeared at 9 a.m. on Trigg's Farm, but they were dismounted Confederate cavalry; (3) and the Federals thought that *Longstreet's* three divisions were present, but they could not locate *Pickett*, nor could they locate *Anderson of Hill's* Corps.

At 8 a.m. the IX. Corps Division in reserve at Wilderness Tavern joined Hancock's right, and Wadsworth of Warren was also added to Hancock's command. All this time Burnside with his two divisions was hanging back, and did not attack till 2 p.m.

## BATTLE OF WILDERNESS, MAY 5-7 43

8.50 a.m. Hancock's right, *i.e.* Birney's command—Birney, Mott, Gibbon, all of the II. Corps, Wadsworth of V. Corps, and the IX. Corps Division—attacked furiously along the Plank road. But just at this time Hancock was paralysed by fears for Barlow on his left—Sheridan's fire on *Stuart's* cavalry could be heard, as well as the artillery of dismounted Confederate cavalry on Barlow's left at Trigg's, insomuch that Hancock despatched two brigades to assist Barlow. Was *Longstreet* on the Federal left ?

Till 10.30 a.m. the contest continued along the front of Sedgwick, Warren, and Hancock, and then the two former generals were directed to suspend operations and to devote themselves to entrenching and to bridging, for which the splendid engineer corps was invaluable. At 11 p.m. firing ceased even on Hancock's front, and still that general waited for Burnside.

Previously to this, *Longstreet* sent two brigades of his own Corps and two brigades of *Hill* to fall on Birney's left, *i.e.* Mott's Division. The four brigades moved along the unfinished railway to its bend, and then, facing north, fell on Mott, 11 a.m., whilst the rest of Birney was held in front by the rest of *Longstreet* and *Hill*. Issuing from the dense wood, the four brigades rolled up Mott, and such was the confusion that Hancock retired all Birney's command to the breastworks on the Brock road. *Longstreet* was therefore arranging

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a general assault, when he was accidentally wounded by his own troops. *Gen. Lee* arriving, postponed the attack, because the troops were in disorder. *Longstreet's* fall was very lucky for Grant, who might conceivably have been routed. On the other hand, Hancock's left was fresh, and had all the II. Corps artillery, and might have routed *Longstreet*.

On the Confederate side the arrival of *Longstreet* and *Anderson* of *Hill* allowed *Heth* and *Wilcox* to form on the north of the Plank road, entrenching through *Chewning's* so as to connect with *Ewell's* right.

In the morning Burnside's IX. Corps—*Potter* and *Willcox*—moved first towards *Chewning's*, and then towards *Tapp's* slowly through thick woods; but finally at 2 p.m. the two divisions came on the enemy entrenched, *i.e.* parts of *Hill* and *Longstreet*. Fighting continued till 5.30 p.m., but the Federals gained no ground. They bivouacked in touch with Hancock on their left.

At 4.15 p.m. troops of *Longstreet* and *Hill* assailed *Birney's* left, south of the Plank road, but were finally driven back. By this time Hancock had nearly exhausted his ammunition, and all the time the forest in front was blazing.

On the Federal right, where was *Sedgwick's* VI. Corps, two brigades of *Ewell*—one being *Gordon's*—fell late in the afternoon on *Sedgwick's* extreme right, whilst the rest of *Early's* Division

## BATTLE OF WILDERNESS, MAY 5-7 45

attacked in front. The flank attack was sudden and effectual, aided as it was by the frontal attack, but darkness coming on saved the Federals. *Early* then took up a line in front of his old line, whilst Sedgwick in the night also occupied a new line, his front and right being thrown back, and to this change the right of Warren conformed. On Hancock's left toward Todd's Tavern actions took place between Sheridan and *Stuart*, but the former could do little because he had to look after the trains.

Cavalry fighting continued, and in spite of May 7. barricades the Confederate horse were driven partly south on Spottsylvania, and partly west along the Catharpin road.

The losses in this great battle were 15,000 Federals and 11,000 Confederates.

*Tactical comments*:—(1) This was the last offensive battle that *Lee* fought, though the Federals did most of the attacking. The result was indecisive and the fighting difficult—owing to the dense forest little could be seen, marching had to be done by the compass, the roar of the musketry being the only other guide. The battle was not desired by Grant. *Lee* knew Grant would move against his right, and it may be asked why he did not oppose the passage of the Rapidan. The reply is that he desired the Federals to enter the Wilderness, which his own men knew, and where guns would be useless, and

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to destroy them there. Grant, owing to his train, could not quit the Wilderness on May 4, and *Lee* fell on him next day. The Federals excelled their opponents in entrenching, and in the battle neither side indulged in manœuvring.

(2) Federal errors may be thus summarised : (A) Warren did not attack promptly on the 5th ; (B) Gibbon did not attack *Longstreet* in flank on the 6th ; (C) If Barlow had advanced at 7 a.m., as ordered by Hancock, *Longstreet* could not have rolled up Mott with the four Confederate brigades ; (D) Birney did not guard his left against surprise ; (E) Neglect of vedettes to report *Gordon's* approach on Sedgwick's right ; (F) Burnside failed Hancock.

(3) The cardinal error of the Confederates was on their left—*Gordon* all day urged a flank attack on Sedgwick's right, *Ewell* and *Early* opposed, and it was *Lee* who finally directed it, and its brilliant success was cut short only by darkness.

(4) Burnside had at first stopped on the Orange railway to protect it against *Lee's* possible movement, but as Grant had decided to abandon that line of supply, it was wrong to leave Burnside there, and indeed it cost Grant a whole corps on May 5. One of *Ewell's* messages being deciphered told Grant on May 4 that *Lee* was making for the Wilderness, so Burnside was called up.



(5) The Federals did not locate *Hill* and

SKETCH OF  
**WILDERNESS**  
of May 6.

**IX** (Part of)

*Wilderness  
Tavern*

**IX** (Part of)

SHERIDAN   
STUART 

  
Todd's



## BATTLE OF WILDERNESS, MAY 5-7 47

*Ewell* till early on the 5th, and yet Sheridan had twenty-four hours for scouting—this was bad work.

(6) At 2.30 p.m. on the 5th, Grant could have destroyed *Hill* and *Ewell*, but he could not ascertain where *Longstreet* was.

(7) Note Grant's tactics of using his whole force at first.

(8) Note that *Hill* used the farm of Tapp's much as Wellington used Hougoumont at Waterloo, as a fortified support.

(9) Causes why *Lee* with half Grant's force arrested him—the wooded ground, Sheridan's defective scouting, *Stuart's* skill in holding Sheridan, in threatening Hancock's left, and in reporting the movement of Grant's trains; *Lee's* veteran infantry as contrasted with the Northern levies.



## CHAPTER VI

### MOVEMENT ON SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE

May 7.  
Grant's  
second  
flank  
move.  
Map C in  
Hum-  
phreys.

AS any attack on *Lee* seemed hopeless, the tenacious Grant, relying on the sea, stuck to his eastward movement—a critical decision. In this decision Grant gave up his rule “never manceuvre,” and also his real objective, *Lee's* army. The Germanna bridge was taken up and relaid at Ely's Ford, for the passage of the wounded; and at 8.30 p.m. the march on Spottsylvania Court House began. *Lee* suspected this, and *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry secured the place first; and accident too favoured the Southerners, for *Lee* had ordered *Gen. Anderson*, commanding 1st Corps vice *Longstreet*, to march at 3 a.m. on the 8th, but that general, wishing to escape the blazing woods, started at 11 p.m. on the 7th. Thus Grant's night march was useless.

#### BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE,

MAY 8—19

May 8. Sheridan was instructed to watch westwards and southwards, and Grant and Meade at Todd's

## MOVEMENT ON SPOTTSYLVANIA 49

Tavern sent part of his cavalry under Merritt south on Spottsylvania, and part under Gregg towards Corbin's Bridge, over the Po on the Catharpin road, two miles west of Todd's, to watch the roads from Parker's.

At 3.30 a.m. Warren joined Merritt on the Brock road, the latter being engaged with *Fitzhugh Lee*. The Southern cavalry leader had barricaded the road, but at 6 a.m. Warren advanced, Robinson leading through dense woods. At 8.30 a.m., however, the division emerged into the open near Alsop's, and passing south down the eastern fork of the Brock road, met a heavy gun and musketry fire from entrenchments near Spindler's. The Federals fell back. The Confederates were *Kershaw's* men of *Anderson's* Corps.

Meantime, Griffin of Warren took the western fork of the Brock road, and also met heavy fire ; but, assisted by Crawford of Warren, held his ground, though *Field* of *Anderson*, coming up, menaced his right. Then Cutler, *vice* Wadsworth, of Warren, repulsed the enemy in fine style, and the V. Corps entrenched 300 yards from *Anderson*. Warren also called up Wright of Sedgwick.

Hancock reached Todd's Tavern at 9 a.m., relieving Gregg's cavalry, who were skirmishing with *Hampton's* cavalry. The II. Corps entrenched at Todd's.

As above stated, *Gen. Anderson* was making for Spottsylvania Court House, *via* Corbin's Bridge

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and the Shady Grove Church road; on the way part of his men turned off to their left and met Warren, as already related; part went on to the Court House, where they drove off Wilson's cavalry, which, circling round by the east, had reached the Court House.

Certain changes in command had been effected by *Lee*. *Hill* being sick, *Early* was assigned to the 3rd Corps, *Gordon* to *Early's* Division of *Ewell*, *Mahone* to *Anderson's* Division of the 3rd Corps. *Ewell*, taking the longest route of *Lee's* troops, i.e. *via* Parker's, marched in great heat, clouds of dust and smoke from burning woods, reaching the Court House at 5 p.m. *Early*, with the 3rd Corps, taking a route between those of *Ewell* and *Anderson*, had a brush with Hancock on the Catharpin road, on which he halted for the night of the 8th, west of Todd's Tavern.

At 1 p.m. Meade ordered Sedgwick and Warren to attack *Gen. Anderson* near the Court House—this effort was not vigorous, the ground being unknown and the men tired. At the same time Grant directed Sheridan to go on his Richmond raid to the River James, i.e. move with his cavalry against *Stuart*, then proceed to the James, get supplies from *Gen. Butler*, and return to the Army of the Potomac. Late in the day Grant ascertained that *Lee's* entire army was massing on the Court House.

May 9. *Early* marched by the Shady Grove Church

## MOVEMENT ON SPOTTSYLVANIA 51

road to the east of the Court House, where he Plan 3. entrenched, covering the road to Fredericksburg. All this day *Lee* strengthened his entrenchments. At the same time Hancock moved to the right of Warren and entrenched, sending one division—Mott's—to the left of Sedgwick, who lay east of Alsop's (on Brock road). All this day Grant strengthened his entrenchments, and the only important events on the Federal side were the death of Sedgwick, whose VI. Corps passed to Gen. Wright; the movement of Burnside's IX. Corps—this Corps, except Ferrero's Division, moved round by the east through Gate's House on to the River Ny, and the movement of Hancock's three Divisions—Birney, Barlow, Gibbon—on the Federal right. They crossed the Po, and pushed on towards the Block House Bridge, but night coming on had to halt.

Position of *Gen. Lee*. On the left *Anderson*, with Divisions of *Field* and *Kershaw* from the River Po, opposite to the right of Warren, to Spindler's at the junction of the Brock and Block House roads, and then over to the east side of the Brock road beyond the left of Warren: it was all entrenched. In the centre *Ewell*, with Divisions of *Rodes* and *Johnson* stretching nearly north through the Bloody Angle or Mule Shoe (which expression sometimes covers the whole salient), and then round north-eastwards to a high point where were several guns. Then

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the entrenchments turned south. In reserve *Gordon's* Division built an entrenchment south of McCool House. *Early's* 3rd Corps on the right then lined southwards across the road from the Court House to Fredericksburg. Guns were at all suitable points; where wood was in front it was slashed, where the ground was open there were abattis.

May 10. *Lee* extended his entrenchments westwards, on the other side of the Po, across the Shady Grove Church road north of the bridge, and formed another entrenchment south of the bridge, east of the Po. The former works, west of the Po, were not raised till after all *Hancock's* men had recrossed the Po, as will be soon related. Later on, the entrenchments east of the Court House were drawn as far south as *Snell's* bridge. All these works were formidable.

*Hancock* reconnoitred the Shady Grove Church road bridge, *i.e.* the Block House bridge, and found the enemy entrenched on the east bank; this was *Mahone* of *Early*. *Hancock* was then instructed by *Meade* to send two divisions to *Warren*, which forces, together with *Wright's* VI. Corps, and *Mott* of II. Corps, were to attack. *Gibbon* and *Birney* at once recrossed to *Warren*, leaving *Barlow* south of the Po. This last division was then assailed by *Heth's* Division of *Early's* 3rd Corps, which division had moved there; *Barlow* also came under fire from *Anderson's* guns, and from guns in the entrenchment,

east of the Block House bridge. In the face of all this, and in spite of the burning woods, the Federal in good order recrossed to the north bank.

On the north of the Po, at 3.45 p.m. and at 7 p.m., divisions of Warren, Hancock and Wright unsuccessfully attacked the lines of *Gen. Anderson*. On the east side of the Brock road Gen. Wright considered the weakest point in the Confederate line to be at the Bloody Angle, where *Doles's* brigade, right of *Rodes's* Division, touched *Walker's* Stonewall Brigade, left of *Johnson's* Division—all of *Ewell*. Gen. Humphreys says: "*Doles's* entrenchment was in open ground two hundred yards from a pine wood, with abattis in front and traverses at intervals. In the re-entrant of the line was a battery with traverses. One hundred yards in the rear was a second line partly finished, occupied by a line of battle." A wood road led straight to the Bloody Angle from the Scott or Shelton House, where the attackers formed. Col. Upton was to attack, with three brigades of the VI. Corps. To help him Mott of II. Corps moved to the Brown House, north of the apex of the Confederate salient (the angle at the high point), under orders to attack that point at the same time.

At 6 p.m. Upton in silence moved, hidden by pine woods and covered by gun-fire. He then rushed the two hundred yards open space, and

## 54 GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA

after a fearful effort carried the first and second entrenched lines. Then it was that Mott should have struck in, but he did not appear; and finally Upton, assailed by *Gordon* and by the Stonewall Brigade, had to withdraw under cover of darkness with the loss of 1,000 men. There is no clear account of Mott's action, but in any case he was repulsed, the more easily because his attack was in no sense a surprise.

On this day Burnside pushed along the Fredericksburg road close to the Court House on the east side and entrenched, Gen. Stevenson falling, and being replaced by Gen. Crittenden. The losses this day are reckoned as 4,000 Federals and 2,000 Confederates.


May 11 Gen. Grant told the President, "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all the summer." On the Confederate side *Lee* returned *Heth* of *Early* to the Court House, forming him south of *Wilcox* of the same corps; but he still retained *Mahone* of that corps east of the Shady Grove Church road bridge.

Grant's  
third  
flank  
move.

At 3 p.m. Grant directed Meade to move Hancock's three divisions during the night round the rear of the V. and VI. Corps, so as to join the IX. Corps, and attack the enemy at 4 a.m. on the 12th,—*i.e.* they would move to Brown's, and there join Mott, Hancock's fourth division. Warren reinforced by Kitching's Heavy Artillery was to occupy the lines vacated by Hancock.


TO ILLUSTRATE  
PENNSYLVANIA  
9 & 10.

WRIGHT



EWELL

EARLY



BURNSIDE





## MOVEMENT ON SPOTTSYLVANIA 55

On this day, the 11th, Burnside retired to the north bank of the Ny.

Early in the day *Mahone* moved to *Early's* <sup>May 12.</sup> right, south of *Heth's* Division, leaving only one <sup>Plan 4.</sup> of his brigades (*Wright's*) to hold the bridge.

At 1 a.m. Hancock reached Brown's, and formed three divisions for attack, holding Gibbon in reserve. At 4.35 a.m. they rushed the entrenchments held by *Johnson* of *Ewell*, penetrating as far as *Gordon's* transverse entrenchment. This success was a good deal due to the fact that the defenders' guns had been retired. As it was, the Federals captured the famous Stonewall Brigade; but they got disordered, and Hancock brought up Gibbon's Division. The retirement of the Confederate guns was due to *Lee's* impression that the Federals would fall on his left, an impression caused by Burnside's retreat to the north of the Ny.

There is some discrepancy in the accounts as to counter-attacks by *Gordon* and *Rodes*; but it seems that Hancock retained the outer face of the entrenchments from the west of Bloody Angle to the apex of the salient—the high point mentioned on page 51.

At 6. a.m. Meade sent in Wright on Hancock's right, *i.e.* on the Bloody Angle, where the fighting was desperate, lasting all day till 3 a.m. May 13. At that hour the Confederate defenders retired to a new entrenchment—built during the night—

## 56 GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA

across the base of the salient, south of Harrison's. In this desperate conflict, May 12—13, *Ewell* was reinforced by parts of *Early's* 3rd Corps; but the Federals retained the Bloody Angle and the apex. The guns of the II. and VI. Corps were active at both angles, and at the Bloody Angle the dead lay in heaps on either side, and all the time it rained pitilessly.

Meantime, at 9.15 a.m. on the 12th, Warren's attack from the Federal right was repulsed by *Anderson*, and in the course of it two Federal divisions are said to have fired on each other by error for three hours. After this failure the whole of Warren moved to support Wright's VI. Corps, except Crawford, who stopped in Warren's old entrenchments.

On the Federal left, at 5 a.m., Burnside vigorously assailed *Early's* 3rd Corps, but was roughly repulsed. The losses during the day were 7,000 Federals, 9,000 Confederates.


May 13.  
Grant's  
fourth  
flank  
move.

About 3 a.m. *Lee* retired from the northern salient, and occupied the new entrenchment, south of Harrison's. On this day Grant again decided to manœuvre by his left. Accordingly, at night, Warren marched *via* Shelton's, Landron's, then over the River Ny to the Fredericksburg road, then down that road and over the Ny again, and then formed on the road on the left of IX. Corps, with orders to attack at 4 a.m. on the 14th.


May 14. The weather was against Warren; there were

ATCH OF  
LVANIA  
12.

NCOCK  


RLY  


C.H.

 BURNSIDE

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## MOVEMENT ON SPOTTSYLVANIA 57

heavy rain and intense darkness, and though he <sup>Plan 5.</sup> reached his point at 6 a.m. he was in no condition to attack, and so the operation was put off, otherwise *Early's* entrenchments might have fallen. Wright's VI. Corps at 3 a.m. followed Warren, and massed north of the Ny on the Massaponax Church road, and then crossed the Ny to Gayle's.

*Lee*, aware of Grant's move, altered his troops. (1) *Wright's* brigade of *Mahone* marched from the Shady Grove Church road bridge and rejoined *Mahone*: (2) *Field* of *Anderson* moved to *Early's* right.

*Kershaw* of *Anderson* also moved to the Con- <sup>May 15—</sup> federate right, whilst on the Federal side Hancock <sup>17.</sup> closed in on Burnside's right, his Corps reduced to three divisions by Mott being incorporated with Birney, but soon raised to normal strength by the addition of Tyler's Division. Entrenchments were improved, and a railway laid to Acquia Creek.

In the hope of surprising *Lee*, Grant directed <sup>May 18.</sup> an assault *via* the apex of the salient at early dawn <sup>Grant returns by his right—fifth flank move.</sup> on the Southern commander's new entrenchments, south of Harrison's, by the II., VI., and IX. Corps. *Ewell* repulsed them, and they found the stench from the corpses such that many turned sick. The VI. Corps then returned to its position near Gayle's, on the left of Warren, and at night all Hancock moved south to the left of Wright's VI. Corps—at Anderson's Mill—except Tyler, who took post near Harris's on the Fredericksburg

## 58 GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA

road; and at night also the IX. Corps marched south to the left of the VI. Corps—at Queensberry's, opposite *Lee's* extreme right. These two corps entrenched. Warren now formed the Federal right, entrenched and, with Tyler, covering the line to Fredericksburg.

May 19. On this day Tyler was assailed in an action at Harris's. *Lee* had sent *Ewell's* 2nd Corps to ascertain if the enemy was really moving south, and in doing this he struck Tyler, his entrenchments meanwhile being held by part of *Anderson*. Warren and Hancock reinforced Tyler, and *Ewell* retired after a lucky escape.

Badeau, in his *Life of Grant*, states that Warren was ordered to cut *Ewell's* retreat, and failed to do so. Humphreys says no such order was issued: Badeau also states that Ferrero's negro Division of IX. Corps played a prominent part at Harris's; Humphreys denies this.

May 20. The operations round Spottsylvania Court House closed with the entire II. Corps, including Tyler, massing at Anderson's Mill, whilst one division of the V. Corps and one of the VI. Corps looked after the line of communications at Harris's.

The Federal losses on the 18th and 19th were 2,000, and from May 8 to 19, 18,000; and from May 3 to 19 the total losses amounted to 37,000, not counting time-expired men. The Southern losses from May 8 to 19 were severe, but fewer, because they were on the defensive.

## MOVEMENT ON SPOTTSYLVANIA 59

### *Tactical comments on Spottsylvania Battle:—*

(1) *Lee's* position was strong, except that the salient (occupied merely because it gave a good view) was a weak point ; the Federals had to reconnoitre in force with infantry because cavalry could not work in the woods. Grant's move by his left after May 12 would have succeeded but for the rain and the darkness. He remained facing *Lee* from May 14 to 17, and then suddenly marched back to the salient, expecting that *Lee* had depleted his centre ; but *Lee* had not done so, and the Federal was repulsed.

(2) Badeau considers that Sheridan's orders on May 8 to his cavalry leaders, Gregg, Merritt, and Wilson, would have led to their holding the only three bridges over the Po, *i.e.* Corbin's, the Shady Grove Church road bridge, and Snell's, and thus blocking *Lee's* approach to the Court House, which he says was lost to the Federals because Meade gave contrary orders to Merritt and Gregg (see pages 48-49).

In fact, however, *Fitzhugh Lee* on the Brock road, *Hampton* on the Catharpin road, and *Anderson* on the Shady Grove Church road, were there soon enough to stop the Northern cavalry ; in any case it led to a quarrel between Sheridan and Meade, and to Grant despatching the former on his raid to the River James. Perhaps, as Col. Edmonds remarks, this raid was decided upon



## 60 GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA

because Sheridan blocked Warren's advance on Spottsylvania.

(3) With regard to Hancock's passage of the Po on the 9th, it was caused by a report from Burnside, whomistook somedismounted cavalry for *Anderson's* infantry. This induced Grant to suppose *Lee* was making for Fredericksburg, and therefore he ordered Hancock across the Po, which was a danger for *Lee*, as Hancock would enfilade *Field's* position and cut the Confederate communications with Louisa Court House. But Hancock was sent too late in the day to effect anything, and next day was unwisely recalled, though he had *Heth* at his mercy. It is to be remarked, however, that if he had not been recalled, the Federal army would have been astride a river in the presence of the enemy, and how dangerous that may be is shown by the events round Bayonne in 1813.

(4) As to Upton's assault on the 10th if it had been earlier and if Mott had really helped, *Lee's* entrenchments would have been carried. Upton's failure was due to the fact that he was not supported—this is a great lesson, and the same thing happened at the Alma, 1854.

(5) Hancock's failure on the 12th was due to over-concentration of force.

(6) *Lee* has been blamed for so fiercely defending the apex of the salient on the 12th; but in fact he could not safely retire in daylight.


TO ILLUSTRATE  
PENNSYLVANIA

4.

INCOCK



BURNSIDE




WARREN

IRLY



ON



WRIGHT



## CHAPTER VII

### MOVEMENT TO THE NORTH ANNA

MANŒUVRING again instead of "hammering," Map A. Grant's sixth flank move. the Federal commander showed his respect for Lee, just as the latter had learnt to respect his resolute opponent. Richmond, too, was beginning to exercise the usual fascination of a fortified capital. Grant therefore moved by his left, with the idea of forcing *Lee* to attack; but that great general outmanœuvred him, and using his interior lines, put himself on the North Anna, covering Richmond. Grant accordingly directed the II. Corps and Torbert's Cavalry Division, *via* Guinea Station and Bowling Green, to Milford Station. If *Lee* fell into the trap, and attacked Hancock when isolated, the three other corps would fall on him. As a fact *Lee* never knew of the trap.

At night Hancock and Torbert moved *via* May 20. Guinea Station, and on May 21 drove *Pickett's* Division of *Anderson*—hitherto absent on the James—out of Milford Station, and secured the bridge there over the Mattaponi River. *Lee* ascertaining this movement from his signal

## 62 GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA

stations shifted *Ewell* to his right over to the south bank of the Po, west of Stannard's Mill, on the Telegraph road. At 10 a.m. Warren started for Guinea Station, whence he crossed the river at Guinea bridge watched by the Southern cavalry.

May 22. Next moved Burnside through Guinea Station, down the Bowling Green road, at 2 a.m., and last of all Wright's VI. Corps reached Guinea Station. These two corps were deterred by a mere rear-guard at Stannard's Mill, and pushed into the long route by Guinea Station. They lost a chance: if they had pushed over at Stannard's Mill, they might have cut off *Early*.

*Lee's* cavalry was watching these movements, and the Southern general started, not to assail Hancock, but to cover Richmond and the Central railway which supplied that capital. *Ewell* went first by the Telegraph road, and reached Hanover Junction this day; *Anderson* followed him; *Early*, passing west of the Telegraph road through Childsburgh, reached Hanover Junction next day, *i.e.* May 23. On this day, May 22, *Hill* returned to command the 3rd Corps, and *Early* resumed his division in *Ewell's* Corps, *Gordon* replacing *Johnson* in that corps.

At Hanover Junction two forces joined *Lee*. (1) *Gen. Breckinridge*, 2,500 infantry, who, having on May 15 beaten the Federal Sigel at Newmarket in the Shenandoah Valley, had left *Imboden* to look after the valley: (2) *Pickett's*

## MOVEMENT TO THE NORTH ANNA 63

Division of *Anderson's* Corps, despatched by *Gen. Beauregard*, who lay entrenched from the Appomattox to the James in front of *Gen. Butler* entrenched at Bermuda Hundred.

This day—May 22—Warren, just in rear of *Anderson*, moved south-west towards Childsburgh, with *Wright* behind him. *Burnside* crossed the Mattapony at Downer's Bridge, and halted at New Bethel Church, between Bowling Green and *Wright's* VI. Corps; *Hancock* stopped at Milford Bridge, and thus all four corps were close together.

The country was more open and cultivated than near Spottsylvania, but *Hancock's* eccentric march had not deluded *Lee*, and it would have been better if all the Federals had marched straight on Hanover Junction by the Telegraph road, which runs thus: Fredericksburg, Massaponax Church, Stannard's Mill, Mitchell's Store, due south across the North Anna to Hanover Junction and Taylorville Station.

Grant ordered *Meade* to move south on the May 23. North Anna, *Hancock* along the railway, *Burnside* west of him, and west of *Burnside* *Warren*, with *Wright* in support. *Warren* crossed at Jericho, finding in his front *Hill*, whom *Lee* severely blamed for allowing *Warren* to cross. *Hill* attacked *Warren*, in whose support *Wright's* VI. Corps arrived, and both corps entrenched. Meantime, *Hancock*, along the Fredericksburg railway,

## 64 GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA

found the enemy entrenched on both sides of the North Anna. He cleared the north side, and occupied the Telegraph road bridge, but the Confederates burnt the south end of the railway bridge. Burnside also approached the river at Ox Ford, west of Hancock and east of Warren, but could not cross in face of the entrenchments on the south side.

## CHAPTER VIII

ON THE NORTH ANNA, MAY 24-26

ON May 24 Sheridan rejoined Grant after his Richmond raid to the River James: this raid had occupied from May 8 to 24. Sheridan, with 10,000 men, marched down the Telegraph road and crossed the North Anna at Anderson's Bridge, followed by *W. F. H. Lee* with 1,000 cavalry. He damaged the Central railway, and crossed the South Anna at Ground Squirrel bridge, damaging the Fredericksburg railway. All this time *Stuart* with 2,000 men was circling round so as to cover Richmond, and was concentrating at Yellow Tavern, where, on May 11, Sheridan worsted and mortally wounded the famous Southern leader, who "never brought *Lee* false information." Sheridan, then, passing down the Chickahominy, reached Haxall's Landing on May 14, returning to Grant *via* White House. This raid was a failure, because the damage was small, and Grant with cavalry could have reached Hanover Junction first. Compare the absence of Hooker's cavalry at Chancellorsville, 1863, of *Lee's* cavalry at



## 66 GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA

Gettysburg, 1863, and of Melas' cavalry at Marengo, 1800.

Map F  
in Hum-  
phreys  
Plan 6.


On May 24, the Confederates having retired from his immediate front, Hancock crossed, finding in front *Anderson* and *Ewell* entrenched. Hancock in turn entrenched, and was reinforced by Potter of Burnside. The last-named general could not cross at Ox Ford, but one of his divisions—Crittenden—crossing higher up, joined Warren, leaving Burnside on the north bank with only one division—Willcox.

On May 25 the V. and VI. Corps were faced by the Confederate left, *Hill* and *Pickett's* Division of *Anderson*, which turned from the N. Anna southwards to the Little River. *Lee's* position was excellent—left on Little R., then north to the N. Anna, along that river at Ox Ford for three-quarters of a mile, then south-east to the N. Anna. This position nonplussed Grant, whose left and right, connected by one division only, were separated by the river. If *Lee* had not been sick, he would probably have crushed Grant in detail. Indeed, it has been suggested that his corps commanders should have tried it; but probably they would have failed, the ground being open and the Federal guns powerful. *Lee* might have done it. Still, so strong was the Confederate position, that Grant got out of his difficulty before *Lee* recovered his health by another flank move to his left. On May 26, to deceive the

TO ILLUSTRATE

ANNA

4 & 25.





**ON THE NORTH ANNA, MAY 24-26 67**

**Southern commander, Wilson's Cavalry Division crossed the N. Anna to the west, and on the same day pontoon-equipage was directed from Washington to Fort Monroe, in the Yorktown Peninsula.**

## CHAPTER IX

### *OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE JAMES*

**Maps G, H.** GEN. BUTLER'S instructions from Grant were that Richmond was his objective, that he must co-operate with the Army of the Potomac, gain City Point, and probably connect with the Army of the Potomac over the James west of Richmond. On April 28 Butler was at Yorktown and Gloster, on the York, giving the impression that he would advance as McClellan had in 1862; but on May 4 he embarked, and escorted by Adm. Lee's fleet ascended the James to Bermuda Hundred Neck, where he landed May 6, having first unshipped 5,000 negroes under Hinks at **Map J.** City Point. Meantime Kautz, from Suffolk on the James, set out on his first raid, *i.e.* to cut the Weldon railway which supplied Richmond.

Butler then entrenched, his left—Gillmore's X. Corps—resting on the Appomattox, his right—Smith's XVIII. Corps—resting on the James. Richmond was defended by field works on all sides; in the river were gunboats and torpedo-boats, and the depth of water did not allow

## OPERATIONS OF ARMY OF JAMES 69

Admiral Lee to reach Drury's Bluff. Torpedoes were planted at certain points, and from Drury's Bluff some entrenchments ran west across the railway and the turnpike, and then northwards. Petersburg was also defended by works. By May 15 the Southern troops at Richmond and Petersburg under *Beauregard* constituted a field army of 22,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and artillery, their arrival having been somewhat delayed by Kautz's raid on the Weldon railway. That cavalry general reached City Point on May 10.

Butler should have attacked immediately after landing. On May 12, however, he marched along the pike on Richmond, Smith on the right, Gillmore on the left, leaving a force in the Bermuda Hundred entrenchments, and dispatching Kautz on a second raid, *i.e.* against the Danville railway. On May 13 he struck the Confederates' entrenchments stretching from Drury's Bluff. The latter abandoned their outer line, and concentrated towards the Bluff. Butler then requested Admiral Lee to move his monitors up the James parallel with the army: this was impossible, and though gunboats could do it, they had to reckon with torpedoes and gun-fire.

On May 14 Butler's troops stood thus: Gillmore and half Smith on the west of the Pike, holding the Confederate outer entrenchments;

## 70 GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA

half Smith on the east of the pike, not holding the Confederate entrenchments, but having a log-breastwork with wire in front, except that on the extreme right the wire was not stretched. In fact Smith's right was weak, and he told Butler so.

At Drury's Bluff *Beauregard* had 17,000 infantry—Divisions of Gens. *Ransom*, *Hoke*, *Colquitt*—besides cavalry and guns. Moreover, there were the Richmond garrison, and at Petersburg *Whiting's* Division of 4,600 infantry, besides 16 guns and 2,000 cavalry. Against them Butler had hardly 19,000 infantry (for a division of Gillmore's X. Corps—5,000 men—had been left at Walthall Junction, Hinks's 5,000 negroes at City Point, and 3,000 men in the Bermuda Hundred entrenchments). *Beauregard* was better entrenched, and Butler's right weak. All this was due to the latter's criminal delay.

In this posture of affairs President Davis urged *Beauregard* to attack; and that officer on May 15 arranged his plan, the object being to cut Butler off from his base at Bermuda Hundred, and to destroy his army. *Ransom* on the left was to form outside the entrenchments at night near the river, and fall on Butler's right; *Hoke* on the right was to form outside the entrenchments west of the pike at night, and merely contain the Federal left; *Colquitt* in reserve; cavalry on the extreme flanks, and with the reserve. *Whiting* at

## OPERATIONS OF ARMY OF JAMES 71

Petersburg was to move out at night ready to march on Walthall, and to take Butler in rear.

### BATTLE OF DRURY'S BLUFF, MAY 16

At 2 a.m. *Ransom* moved out; *Hoke* and *Colquitt* also took up their positions. At 4.45 a.m., in thick fog, *Ransom* fell heavily on Smith's right, and routed it, and seriously engaged with Smith's left. At 6.30 a.m. *Hoke*, delayed by the fog, fell on Gillmore and on Smith's left, taking five guns; and soon after *Ransom*, moving by his left, so threatened the Federal communications, that Smith fell back, and formed at Halfway House on the pike to cover those communications. The effect of this movement was to cause Gillmore also to retire, which he did fighting heavily, and finally formed on the pike in rear of Smith.

*Beauregard* now waited for *Whiting*; that officer had moved on Walthall Junction, where he was resisted by the X. Corps division. He heard no sounds of battle in the north, and not till 7.15 p.m. did he get an order from *Beauregard* calling on him to advance. It was too late. At 4 p.m. *Beauregard* decided to advance without waiting for *Whiting*, but a heavy storm prevented him; and that night Butler's force, including the X. Corps division at Walthall Junction, got back to the entrenchments at Bermuda Hundred. Losses were 3,500 Federals, 2,000 Confederates.



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Next day *Beauregard* entrenched in front of Butler, who was then securely bottled.

*Tactical comments* :—*Beauregard* attributed his partial failure to *Ransom's* and *Whiting's* want of vigour, but fog delayed the one and the X. Corps division stopped the other.

Meantime, Gen. Kautz in his second raid had damaged the Danville railway and the Southside or Petersburg and Lynchburg railway, returning to City Point on May 17.

On May 22 Grant, learning of these operations, ordered Butler to retain sufficient troops out of Smith's command to hold City Point, and to transport the rest of that general's corps to White House, on the Pamunkey. Smith took 16,000 men and 16 guns; Butler retaining 14,000, including all the cavalry. *Beauregard* likewise despatched *Pickett's* Division and *Hoke's* Division to *Lee*, himself retaining 9,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry.

## CHAPTER X

*TOTOPOTOMOY, MAY 26-31*

ON May 26, at night, Grant began his seventh flank movement, *i.e.* down the east bank of the Pamunkey, and to cross near Hanover Town. Part of Sheridan's cavalry preceded and part followed the infantry corps, and it being very dark, the Confederates did not notice the retirement. The VI. Corps went first, then the II. Corps, both close to the river. Warren's V. Corps, and Burnside's IX. Corps, now an integral part of the Army of the Potomac, moved more to the east.

At 9 a.m. Sheridan occupied Hanover Town, near which he met some Southern cavalry. Wright and Hancock made for Huntley's or Hundley's; Warren and Burnside for Hanover Town. The theatre included the Totopotomoy and the Matadequin, tributaries of the Pamunkey, and the Chickahominy, tributary of the James, all of them marshy and liable to floods. The roads running in all directions were extremely numerous.

Wright crossed to Crump's Creek, Hancock

## 74 GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA

**Plan 7.** on the left towards Hawes's ; Warren also crossed, resting his left on the Totopotomoy ; last of all Burnside crossed. This day Gregg's Cavalry Division of Sheridan came about a mile west of Hawes's on the Confederate cavalry under *Hampton* and *Fitzhugh Lee* dismounted and behind breastworks ; the action was severe, but the Southerners were driven out of their entrenchments.

As to *Gen. Lee*, he, having at 7 a.m. on May 27 discovered Grant's movement, began to fall back on Ashland, on the Fredericksburg railway ; *Early*, 2nd Corps, *vice Ewell* sick, moved south, and on May 28 faced eastwards, his left on the Totopotomoy near Pole Green Church ; *Anderson*, 1st Corps, moved into position near Walnut Grove Church on *Early's* right ; *Breckinridge* and *Hill* formed along the Totopotomoy from *Early's* left to Atlee's Station. The cavalry were partly at Hawes's and partly at Hanover Court House. In brief, *Lee* was covering the roads from the Pamunkey to Richmond.

**May 29.** The Federals reconnoitred in force, Sheridan being on their left on the Old Church road. Wright, moving on Hanover Court House, met only hostile cavalry ; Hancock, moving on Atlee's Station, naturally struck the Confederates' left and centre entrenched, south of the Totopotomoy, *i.e.* the left of *Early*, *Breckinridge*, and *Hill's* 3rd Corps ; Warren, crossing the Totopotomoy into the Shady Grove Church road, found the enemy in

force. In fact, *Lee* was in front. This last corps—the Vth—was open to attack by *Early* and *Anderson*, but the deaths of *Jackson* and *Stuart* and the illness of *Longstreet* had damped the ardour of the Southern forces.

Wright tried to come up on Hancock's right, May 30. and to turn the Confederate left flank, but the swampy ground of Crump's Creek made his arrival too late: Hancock engaged meantime in heavy gunfire.

Burnside crossed the Totopotomoy and massed near Whitlock's, on Hancock's left. Warren down the Shady Grove Church road came on *Early* entrenched at Huntley's Corner, whilst part of his corps moved into the Old Church road, where it was roughly handled by *Early's* troops. To relieve the stress on Warren, Hancock a little after 7 p.m. attacked in front. When *Early* moved his men into the Old Church road from Huntley's Corner, *Anderson* occupied the latter place.

On the Federal left Sheridan, with two cavalry divisions, drove some Southern horse from the Matadequin Creek back on Cold Harbour, whilst his other cavalry division was on Crump's Creek on the right. This same day Gen. Smith from Butler's command landed at White House, and thence moved up south of the Pamunkey to join Grant.


The infantry corps merely remained in position, May 31. but Sheridan on the Federal left drove *Fitzhugh*


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*Lee* out of Old Cold Harbour and entrenched himself there, an important centre of roads; and Wilson's cavalry division on the Federal right also drove the Southern cavalry out of Hanover Court House.

On the Confederate side *Early* moved more to the north, *i.e.* between Huntley's Corner and Old Church road, whilst *Anderson* came more south, so as to be on *Early's* right—*i.e.* he stood south of the Old Church road with *Hoke's* Division, which, 6,000 strong, had just joined *Lee* from *Beauregard*, on his extreme right near Old Cold Harbour, as also *Fitzhugh Lee*.

ETCH OF THE  
OTOMOY  
8 & 29.





## CHAPTER XI

*COLD HARBOUR, JUNE 1-12*

VERY early Wright's VI. Corps moved round by <sup>Map E</sup> Hawes's for Old Cold Harbour: and on the <sup>June 1.</sup> same place was directed Gen. Smith from the Pamunkey, with 10,000 of his men—*Lee* was ignorant of this general's presence. At 9 a.m. Wright reached Old Cold Harbour, and relieved Sheridan, who passed towards the Chickahominy to cover the Federal left; by 2 p.m. all the VI. Corps had arrived, and by 6 p.m. Smith was posted on the right of the VI. Corps—*i.e.* between Old Cold Harbour and Bethesda Church at Woody's. He had been delayed through a clerical error, which had first sent him on New-castle.

The Confederate entrenchments were 1,400 yards west of Smith and Wright, and their troops were as stated above. At 6 p.m. Smith and Wright attacked and captured part of the hostile entrenchments. On the Federal right, Wilson's cavalry, in spite of *W. H. F. Lee*, managed to break the two railway bridges over the South



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Anna. Grant had expected that his V., VI. and XVIII. Corps would have rolled up *Lee's* right.

June 2.

Grant's  
eighth  
flank  
move.

Warren drew south of Bethesda Church so as to get closer to Smith's right; Burnside withdrew from Whitlock's and massed behind Warren's right, which was also protected by drawing Wilson's cavalry division southwards from Hanover Court House. Very early, 1 a.m., Hancock left the Totopotomoy and set out for Old Cold Harbour. He arrived at 7.30 p.m., in an exhausted condition, on the left of Wright's VI. Corps, stretching south of Barker's Mill. Owing to heat, exhaustion, and Smith's lack of ammunition, the assault was postponed till 4.30 a.m. June 3.

As to the Confederates, *Lee* observing the Federal movements, transferred *Hill* with the two divisions of *Wilcox* and *Mahone* to his right, reaching as far as the Chickahominy, and *Breckinridge* was moved into the space between *Hoke* and *Hill*; on the extreme right, across the Chickahominy, stood *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry division. In the centre, north of *Hoke*, came *Anderson's* corps, and on the left as far as *Via*, *Early's* 2nd Corps and *Heth's* Division of *Hill*. These two forces *Lee* swung round on the Federal right, along the Shady Grove Church road, *i.e.* on Warren's V. Corps and on the retiring IX. Corps, and a fierce action resulted.

Grant was displeased when he learnt that the

## COLD HARBOUR, JUNE 1-12 79

V. and IX. Corps had not counter-attacked; but all his generals, except Hancock, lacked initiative.

### BATTLE OF COLD HARBOUR, JUNE 3

The fact that *Lee* had again interposed, caused Grant to lose his temper, and he attacked without any manœuvring. Indeed, Grant confessed afterwards that this battle should not have been fought. *Lee's* strongly entrenched position stretched from the Chickahominy to the swamps of the Totopotomoy, and Grant assailed in front with the II., VI. and XVIII. Corps. June 3.  
Plan 8.

At 4.30 a.m. these three corps advanced, and after desperate fighting, and with heavy loss, carried the enemy's rifle-pits and put themselves in cover, at some points only fifty yards from the Confederate main line. The enfilading artillery-fire of the Confederates was especially deadly; and at 1.30 p.m. Meade suspended attack, directing the men to entrench on the ground they had gained. It is said that Grant ordered a second attack, and that the men refused.

Meantime on the Federal right, Burnside had captured the advanced rifle-pits on *Early's* left, his efforts being seconded by Warren's V. Corps. At the same time Wilson's cavalry operated against *W. H. F. Lee* near Hawes's. Note the superior gun-fire of *Lee's* army.

*Heth's* Division passed to the right to join its June 4.


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corps—*Hill's*—and various indecisive attacks were delivered.

June 5. Hancock extended his left to the Chickahominy: Warren's V. Corps moved to the rear of Old Cold Harbour; Burnside's IX. Corps joining at Woody's with the right of Smith's XVIII. Corps, formed at right angles with that corps along the Matadequin Creek. From this day to the 12th the armies remained facing each other, skirmishing and gun-fire incessant both night and day and on both sides, says Humphreys, the trench work was arduous, water insanitary, heat oppressive, sleep rare, vegetables deficient, meat inferior, corpses putrefying, and malaria prevalent. The losses from May 27 to June 12 were: Federals 17,000, Confederates 5,000.

SKETCH OF  
HARBOR

ne 3.





## CHAPTER XII

### PASSAGE OF THE JAMES RIVER

SHERIDAN, with two cavalry divisions, marched June 7. west to Charlottesville to destroy the Central <sup>Maps A,</sup> railway, and to meet Gen. Hunter and bring <sup>H in</sup> him back to the Army of the Potomac. <sup>Humphreys.</sup> In the Shenandoah Valley, Hunter on June 5 had defeated the Confederate *Jones* at Piedmont, and then joined Crook and Averell at Staunton, whence they moved *via* Lexington for Lynchburg, an important manufacturing centre. The beaten Confederate force fell back eastwards to Waynesborough. Lee at once returned *Breckinridge* to the Valley, and sent *Hampton* and *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry on the heels of Sheridan ; and on June 13 *Early* started for the Valley with orders to pick up *Breckinridge*, to rout Hunter, and to move down the Valley against Washington. The object was to protect the Valley, the great supply ground of Richmond, and to induce Grant to detach troops for the protection of Washington, as McClellan had in 1862. *Lee* by thus detaching this force showed that he had resolved on the defensive,

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and meant only to gain time in the hope of foreign intervention.

The Army of the Potomac was preparing to cross the James, whilst south of that river Gen. Butler on June 9 made an effort against Petersburg: Gillmore with 1,800 whites, 1,200 of Hinks's negroes from City Point, and 1,500 horse under Kautz, moved against the city on the west side; but *Gen. Wise's* entrenchments proved too strong.

Grant's idea in crossing the James was to cut all railways south of Richmond (especially the Weldon railway, which led to Wilmington in N. Carolina, the one port the Federals could not blockade), as he had to the north of the Southern capital. The point of passage was to be Wilcox's Landing, but the Chickahominy had to be crossed first. Over this last river were several bridges, then broken, and on the south of it lay the difficult White Oak Swamp. Between this swamp and the James River ran three main roads to Richmond—the Charles City, the Darbytown or Central, the Newmarket or River—and from Long's Bridge on the Chickahominy ran the Long Bridge road right across the three other roads. In crossing the Chickahominy Warren and Hancock would use the Long Bridge, Wright and Burnside the Jones Bridge, and the trains the Windsor Shades Crossing; Wilson's cavalry would cover van and rear. Smith's XVIII.

## PASSAGE OF THE JAMES RIVER 83

Corps was to embark at White House for Bermuda Hundred, where Butler then lay.

The movement was to commence from Cold Harbour on the night of June 12, and Warren, after crossing the Chickahominy, was to cover the march, *viâ* Charles City Court House, towards the James. To do this he was to hold the Long Bridge road, and his movements deceived *Lee* as to Grant's operation up to June 17. White House dépôt was to be maintained, till Hunter and Sheridan should arrive.

At night the Federals marched, and at 1 a.m. on the 13th Wilson's cavalry and Warren's V. Corps crossed at Long Bridge. The other three corps followed, and by June 14 all had reached Wilcox's Landing, where a bridge was constructed 700 yards long. On that day Smith's transports ferried Hancock across, and by the 16th the three other corps had passed to the right bank, Admiral *Lee* covering their passage.

June 12.  
Grant's  
ninth  
flank  
move.

As to the Confederates, *Lee* discovering Grant's retirement from Cold Harbour, crossed the Chickahominy on June 13, with *Anderson* and *Hill*, and made for Riddell's shop, where he skirmished with Wilson's cavalry. Of the Federal army, Hancock was the first to move—on June 15—to Petersburg.



## CHAPTER XIII

### ASSAULTS ON PETERSBURG, JUNE 15-18

June 15.  
Map I  
in Hum-  
phreys.

SMITH, having landed at Bermuda Hundred, was directed on Petersburg with 10,000 of his own men, 2,400 of Kautz's cavalry, and 3,700 of Hinks's negroes. He was to attack the entrenchments near the City Point railway. The defenders were then only few, and the Federals carried redans 5 and 6, as also redans 7 to 11—this last at the Dunn House—with sixteen guns. The Confederates still held the four redans from the Appomattox to the City Point railway and all the redans south of No. 11, but about 6 p.m. Hancock was known to be coming up to the support of Smith.

On the Confederate side *Beauregard* called on *Lee* for reinforcements, but that great commander, still uncertain, retained *Hill* and *Anderson* at Riddell's shop, and sent only *Hoke's* Division, which reached Petersburg this day, the 15th, the defenders constructing new entrenchments facing the ones they had lost.

June 16. Burnside's IX. Corps and Warren's V. Corps arrived in front of Petersburg. On the Confede-

## ASSAULTS ON PETERSBURG, JUNE 85

rate side *Beauregard* despatched *Johnson's* Division to Petersburg, leaving the Bermuda Hundred entrenchments weakly held, whilst *Lee* was hurrying to those entrenchments with *Pickett* and *Field's* Division of *Anderson*, *Kershaw's* Division and *Hill's* 3rd Corps still stopping near Riddell's shop, because *Lee* was not sure if Grant had crossed the James. The two Confederate divisions arrived at the Southerners' Bermuda Hundred lines.

At Petersburg *Gen. Beauregard* had *Hoke's* Division, *Johnson's* Division, *Wise's* Brigade, and *Dearing's* cavalry, *i.e.* 14,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry plus artillery, holding in that order from the north the east front of five miles; and, indeed, the Federals could with more ease have entered the town from the south. *Beauregard* had no reinforcements till the 18th. On this day, the 16th, the Federals carried redans 12, 13, 14—south of Dunn House—and 4.

Potter's Division of the IX. Corps carried the works round the Shand House with the bayonet June 17. and without firing a shot. The defenders were asleep. Other fierce attacks followed along the Harrison Creek, but at midnight the Confederates still held from the Appomattox to redan 3, their entrenchments running from that point south along the high ground west of Harrison's Creek to the Norfolk railway.

That night *Beauregard* retired 500 yards across a ravine and created a new entrenchment inter-

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secting the old one at the Jerusalem plank road : he thus shortened his line ; and on this day *Lee* learnt for the first time that Grant had crossed the James. *Wright's* VI. Corps, the last to cross, carried two divisions by boat to reinforce *Butler* in the Bermuda Hundred. Grant could have taken Petersburg but for *Sheridan's* absence on a useless raid, and Petersburg was stronger than Richmond and essential to the latter's safety.

June 18. Leaving *Pickett* of *Anderson* in the Bermuda entrenchments, *Lee* in person carried the two other divisions—*Field* and *Kershaw*—to Petersburg, where they formed on *Beauregard's* right, as also did *Hill's* 3rd Corps in the course of the day. This day *Meade* assaulted with the II. Corps near the Hare House, and with the IX. Corps and the V. Corps to the south. The troops pressed on, the II. Corps concealed by woods, the IX. and the V. stopped by the Norfolk railway cut, which the Southerners held. At 12 noon the II. Corps was repulsed, but later on *Burnside* carried the railway cut and established himself 100 yards from the Confederate main line : *Warren*, however, was repulsed. The Federals then entrenched and stopped there till the end of the war, for they had lost the energy of the Wilderness, and were at heart afraid of their redoubtable antagonist, Losses from June 15 to 18 : Federals, 10,000 ; Confederates, unknown, and the operations had exhausted both sides.

## CHAPTER XIV

### *MOVEMENTS AGAINST THE RAILWAYS*

GRANT then decided to invest Petersburg by <sup>Maps A, I in</sup> entrenchments drawn by the south towards <sup>Humphreys.</sup> the Lynchburg—Southside—railway: Kautz's cavalry returned to Butler, whilst the two VI. Corps divisions rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

On the east of Petersburg the troops stood thus <sup>June 21.</sup> from the north: XVIII. Corps, IX. Corps, V. Corps, with its left on the Jerusalem plank road at Fort Sedgwick, II. Corps, VI. Corps; the idea being to seize the Weldon and Lynchburg railways.

As the II. Corps and VI. Corps moved west <sup>June 22.</sup> towards the Weldon railway, a gap occurred between them, and into it rushed *Hill*, coming down the railway, and inflicted much loss.

### SHERIDAN'S RAID

On June 7 Sheridan with two cavalry divisions had started for Charlottesville in order to break the Central railway, and then to meet Hunter and bring him back to Grant. During his march he encountered on June 11, at Trevilian Station,

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the cavalry of *Hampton* and *Fitzhugh Lee*. He attacked them in detail, and rushed the horses of *Hampton's* men whilst the latter were fighting on foot. Finally the Confederate horse fled on Gordonsville. Sheridan thus opposed, and learning that Hunter was moving *vid* Lexington on Lynchburg, wisely returned, and on June 21 reached White House, followed by *Hampton*. The dépôt there was broken up, and the trains, covered by Sheridan, crossed the Chickahominy and the James, though assailed by *Hampton* and *Fitzhugh Lee*. Sheridan then hurried west to the Jerusalem plank road to cover the left of the army, whilst *Hampton* and *Fitzhugh Lee* were recalled and despatched against Wilson's cavalry, which was raiding the Lynchburg and Danville railways.

### WILSON'S RAID.

Wilson and Kautz with 5,500 men started June 22, and reached Burkesville, destroying as they went; they then turned south, breaking the Danville railway. *W. H. F. Lee's* cavalry followed, and as some militia opposed them, they returned northwards by a route to the east, Wilson erroneously, but naturally, supposing that Grant's left held the Weldon railway—he had been so informed. *Gen. Lee*, acting on information from *W. H. F. Lee*, despatched *Hampton* and *Fitzhugh Lee's* cavalry with some infantry and guns to Reams's Station on the Weldon railway.

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This force intercepted Wilson and Kautz at Reams's Station, June 29. Wilson at once destroyed his wagons and retired south. Kautz could not follow, but dashing east managed to rejoin the army, though with the loss of all his guns. As to Wilson, he was followed by *Hampton*, but turning east and then north rejoined the army on July 2. This raid lasted ten days. Wilson went 300 miles, and destroyed 60 miles of railroad—soon repaired—and lost 1,500 men and 12 guns. The railways, indeed, were not sufficiently injured to cut off the Southern supplies. The total Federal losses since May 1 are stated as about 65,000, but Grant received 55,000 reinforcements; the Confederate losses are unknown: though Bigelow puts them at 20,000; more probably they were 40,000.

## CHAPTER XV

### CONNECTED ACCOUNT OF THE SHENANDOAH OPERATIONS

Map A  
in Hum-  
phreys.

THE valley was once again the scene of operations—this time finally favourable to the North. Early in 1864 Gen. Sigel commanded in the Valley and in West Virginia, with orders to cover the Baltimore and Ohio railway, which supplied Washington from the west, and to damage the Central railway running through Staunton, whilst Crook and Averell from West Virginia would destroy the Virginia and Tennessee railway running through Lynchburg.

May 1-19. Averell with cavalry tried to break up the Tennessee railway west of Newbern—on railway west of Lynchburg—but the Confederate *John Morgan* drove him off. Crook, however, succeeded in burning the railway bridge at Newbern, and then both he and Averell retired to Meadow Bluff in West Virginia.

On April 30 Sigel moved up the Valley with about 6,000 men, and struck *Breckinridge* near Newmarket, the latter having about equal num-

bers. The result was the Battle of Newmarket, May 15, in which *Imboden's* cavalry turned Sigel's left, and he had to retire behind Cedar Creek—north of Strasburg. At that moment Gen. Hunter superseded Sigel. He and Crook had indeed failed, because, though they had contained certain forces, those forces were inferior to themselves.

On May 28 Hunter, with 8,500 men and 21 guns, moved south up the Valley with rapidity and depending on requisitions. *Breckinridge* having departed to join *Lee*, *Imboden's* cavalry was no match for the Federal, who on June 5 at Piedmont—seven miles south-west of Port Republic—defeated and killed *Gen. Jones*. This last officer, with 5,000 men, had come up from Lynchburg. The beaten Confederates under *Vaughan* fled east on Waynesborough, on the railway between Charlottesville and Staunton. Hunter then entered Staunton, joining Crook and Averell (10,000 strong), and, breaking up the Central railway, advanced with his 18,000 men and 30 guns on Lynchburg, not *via* Charlottesville, as Grant had intended, but *via* Lexington, 36 miles south of Staunton, because *Vaughan* was at Rockfish Gap, close to Waynesborough. This was a fatal error, and, worse still, he went slowly.

*Lee*, hearing of Piedmont, despatched *Breckinridge* and *Early* to the Valley. The former passed the Blue Ridge at Rockfish Gap, joining *Vaughan*, and hurried to Lynchburg, where *Early* arrived on



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June 17. Hunter was approaching from the west, and on the 18th attacked, but finding the enemy in strength decided on retreat. His ammunition was failing, and he could not retire down the Valley, because *Early* could, *via* Rockfish Gap, take him in flank, and so he was driven to move west to the Kanawha Valley in West Virginia. He marched rapidly, and on the 27th reached Gauley Bridge on the Kanawha, where supplies awaited him. This expedition had not really damaged the railways, and had not occupied Charlottesville or Lynchburg, and the troops were so exhausted that they could not be used to defend Washington: its only good result had been to cause *Lee* to detach troops.

*Early* then proceeded to carry out the third invasion of the North by the South, with 17,000 men and 40 guns. In doing this he reached Staunton on June 27.

It should be added that Grant's menacing position at Cold Harbour, June 5-12, was assumed to prevent *Lee* from detaching against Hunter; but the Federal general moved on the 12th, and at once *Lee* detached a force to the Valley.

## CHAPTER XVI

### GENERAL COMMENTS

**D*****IVIDED Command, Effects of.***—On the Southern side, *President Davis* was Commander-in-chief; and on the Northern side Grant occupied the same position from March 9, and his discretion was not interfered with by President Lincoln, except in the appointment of Butler to the command of the Army of the James. But the evil results of a divided command were obvious in the Federal operations, as they had been in Spain, 1809 (Wellington, Cuesta, Venegas), and in Silesia, 1760 (Laudohn the Austrian and Buturlin the Russian); Grant and Meade, Meade and Burnside, Grant and Butler supplied cases of divided command, and the natural result disclosed itself in the abortive operation of Hancock over the River Po on May 9 and 10; and in the operation of Smith and Hancock on June 15 against Petersburg. Smith belonged to Butler's army, and Grant arranged his (Smith's) movement with Butler without informing Meade, and consequently Hancock was not ordered to march early enough

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to help Smith; result was that Petersburg was not captured for nine months. It should have fallen on June 15 as a result of Grant's able passage of the James.

*Cavalry, Tactical and Strategic Work of.*—The uses of cavalry—the strategic arm before battle—are scouting, screening, raiding, pursuing, and charging. The War of Secession revived the first three uses of this arm, forgotten since the days of Napoleon. Cavalry raids were numerous, but the wisdom of them is disputed, and Grant's employment of his mounted arm was not judicious. He so often dispersed his mounted men: *e.g.* why was not Wilson's raid against the Danville railway undertaken by Sheridan with all the cavalry? These raids are more applicable to America than to Europe, and in any case the objections to them are weighty: *e.g.* waste of horseflesh; the damage done is soon repaired; the main army may regret the absence of its horsemen; and the raiding cavalry runs the risk of being completely wiped out—*e.g.* Wilson at Reams's Station. On the other hand, the raid inflicts damage, destroys the enemy's "moral," raises one's own "moral," and at times gains valuable information. If a raid has a definite object, it seems justifiable—*e.g.* *Forrest's* raid to Holly Springs. On the whole, as Von der Goltz says, the balance of opinion seems to be against such use of cavalry, although in this particular war the South could ill afford the loss

of food and of railway wagons which the raids involved.

The cavalry on both sides were of much more use strategically than they were tactically, the ground not favouring their action in battle; on the whole, the Southern horsemen proved themselves superior.

Note: (1) Sheridan's Richmond raid to the James, May 8-24; a failure; and Grant regretted the absence of his horsemen; of course Stuart's death was an accident; (2) Sheridan's raid against the Central railway, June 7-21; (3) Kautz's raid against the Weldon railway, May 5-10; (4) Kautz's raid against the Danville and Lynchburg railways, May 12-17; (5) Wilson's excellent screening of the passage of the James; (6) Wilson's raid against the Danville and Lynchburg railways, June 22-July 2, and note his danger at Reams's.

*The Federal Command of the Sea.*—This was a great advantage, and by it Grant shifted his base from the Orange and Alexandria railway to Fredericksburg, Port Royal, White House, City Point—compare Wellington's change of base in the Peninsular War—and by it every Southern port, except Wilmington, was blockaded, though before the blockade was complete much cotton-land had been turned into corn-land, and foreigners had established ordnance factories. Coffee, salt, meat, and fish, however, remained

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scarce. The command of the sea conferred all the advantages of a re-entrant and of an extensive base, allowing of Grant's constant change of the line of operations. It effects surprise and transfers troops, but it does not decide a war, and indeed in 1866 and in 1870-1 the command of the sea was possessed by the losing side.

*Passage of the James.*—This was a feat of which any general might be proud. Major Duane in seven hours constructed the bridge with 101 pontoons anchored to ships, for the V., VI., and IX. Corps: a prodigy of war—compare the bridge of Cæsar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book IV., cap. 17, and Wellington's bridge over the Adour, 1814. The James was 700 yards wide and 90 feet deep, and the three corps passed in 48 hours; great secrecy was preserved.

### GENERAL IDEA ON BOTH SIDES

General Grant was a great and successful soldier. In 1862 and 1863 he had won striking successes in the West, and in 1864 was pitted against the most formidable of American leaders, and he acted against him with unflinching resolution, and in the end triumphed. In 1864, however, it must be admitted that Grant's campaign was a failure: he had not shattered *Lee*, he had not taken Richmond, he had not cut the Confederate railways. Strategically he acted well, tactically

he fought useless battles, and his losses were stupendous. He was never strong enough to hold *Lee* in front and at the same time to threaten his flanks, as Sherman did in the Atlanta Campaign, 1864; and on crossing the Pamunkey he committed his greatest blunder—he lost the initiative.

The whole operation of Butler's force was badly conceived; he was a political and civilian general foisted on Grant by the President; his army was not a detachment, and was too large; he should have been directed on Petersburg, not on Richmond; and Grant would have done well to take some of Butler's troops, or some of the Washington troops, instead of the inefficient IX. Corps. Butler, on landing, should at once have captured Petersburg, and routed *Beauregard's* men as they came up from the south; his orders, however, were explicit—"Move on Richmond." His worst error was in allowing himself to be "bottled up" in Bermuda Hundred.

The fact is that the leader of a detachment should be a good man, ready to act on his own initiative, and Butler, if he had had the capacity of a Jackson, would have seized Petersburg at first.

Sigel had to be left in the Valley because it was a great supply centre for the Confederates, because the latter had a force there, and might by that line threaten Washington. Grant's

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directions to Sigel were good, but Sigel himself was incompetent.

Captain Vaughan-Sawyer goes so far as to suggest that the whole operations of Butler and of the Valley forces were an error, and considers that they would have better reinforced the main army; he says that by them Grant lost over 40,000 men, who detained only 18,000 Confederates. I would remark on this, that Grant's train, already cumbersome, would have been still more unwieldy, and indeed I altogether disagree with the criticism.

Sigel's defeat at Newmarket was on a small scale an instance of double or exterior lines conducted without proper connection, *i.e.* Crook did not assist him. Grant's whole campaign was also on double lines, but on a large scale.

The celebrated Southern general, hampered though he was by the loss of *Jackson*, *Stuart*, and *Longstreet*, showed his skill in recognising the necessity of adopting the defensive against an antagonist of Grant's calibre. He fought to gain time for foreign intervention, which England's neutrality alone barred.

He acted on interior lines, and having a large salient with his base, Richmond, inside it, could always fall back on that city; and besides he had the population generally favourable to him. Acting on interior lines, he had to keep apart the Federal armies moving on exterior lines, so that

they should not unite and crush him with their superior numbers: *e.g.* *Lee* opposed Grant in the Wilderness, *Breckinridge* opposed Sigel in the Valley, and *Beauregard* opposed Butler near Petersburg. *Breckinridge* beat Sigel, and then rightly joined *Lee* at Cold Harbour, and *Beauregard* "bottled" Butler. But *Lee* could not prevent Grant from crossing the James and uniting with Butler, and that ultimately sealed his fate—compare Benedek's defeat at Königgrätz, 1866. *Lee's* great error, and Grant's great triumph, appeared in the passage of the James, on June 15, 16, and 17. *Lee* refused to credit it. If he had on June 15 reinforced Petersburg with *Anderson's* corps, Grant would have been terribly defeated, and his career ended. The Southern general's slowness in helping *Beauregard* was due to want of intelligence as to Grant's movements (*Stuart*, the great scouter, was dead, and most of *Lee's* cavalry were opposing Sheridan at Trevylian Station), and to a belief that *Beauregard* was exaggerating. That general had indeed proposed earlier that *Lee* should send him 15,000 men, that Butler should be crushed, and then that he himself should unite with *Lee* against Grant; but *President Davis* vetoed this.

Grant's correct plan should have been the strategic offensive and the tactical defensive—*i.e.* to manœuvre the enemy into such a position that he could escape only by attacking at a



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disadvantage, as the Japanese succeeded in doing at the Sha-Ho, 1904-5. His actual plan was to wear *Lee* out by mere weight of numbers. His constant manœuvring by his left was facilitated by his command of the sea, which gave him all the advantages of a re-entrant and of an extensive base. He acted on exterior lines, and his triumph was the crossing of the James, an operation well screened by Wilson's cavalry; and *Lee* would, if Grant had had any luck, have been pinned in Richmond. This indeed was the moment for the South to offer terms of surrender.

All these operations formed part of the never-ceasing battle—Grant v. *Lee*—May 1, 1864, to April 9, 1865, marked by absence of rest, by night marches, by night attacks (though *Gen. Alexander* says that Wauhatchie, near Chattanooga, October 28, 1863, was the only real night attack in this war), by little artillery preparation, and by constant use of entrenchments (both by defenders and by assailants), which, though liable to be turned by a night march, led to lengthy battles. The entrenching work was excessive, *e.g.* May 5 Hancock's stopping to entrench gave *Hill* time.

### LIST OF GRANT'S FLANK MOVES

- (1) Over the Rapidan, May 4-6.
- (2) To Spottsylvania Court House, May 7-8.
- (3) Hancock's move to the left, night of May 11-12.

- (4) Warren's move to the left, May 13.
- (5) Grant's return by his right with the II., VI., IX. Corps, May 18.
- (6) Grant's move to the N. Anna, May 20.
- (7) Grant's move down the Pamunkey, May 26.
- (8) Hancock on Old Cold Harbour, June 2.
- (9) Grant's move to the James, June 12.

*Artillery.*—Grant appears to have relied on guns only on May 18. He hardly ever used artillery preparation, and on moving to the N. Anna sent back 92 guns to Washington, and thus at that river was scarcely stronger than *Lee* in that arm. The want of these guns was severely felt at the N. Anna and at Cold Harbour. Col. Edmonds remarks that without guns frontal infantry assaults on entrenched positions are of no use, *e.g.* Hancock at Spottsylvania was 20 deep, and no attack was less than 4 deep; but all failed. Compare the Russian failure at Plevna, 1877, and contrast the Prussian success (prepared by 100 siege guns) against the very formidable Danish works at Düppel, 1864.

Of course, when a whole frontier is fortified, as in the case of France, you must assault somewhere, but in general the best plan to deal with a strong entrenched position is to entrench in front of it, and then to manoeuvre round the enemy's flank—Grant tried this once, *i.e.* after Spottsyl-

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vania, when Warren was to hold the trenches in front, but *Lee* moved.

*Reconnaissance* : very little of it in a real sense ; there was no proper staff system, and the troops attacked piecemeal, *e.g.* at Petersburg.


*Night Marches* were frequent ; their objects are to bring the enemy to action, to seize an important point, to steal a march, to avoid heat ; but they always exhaust troops, and in this case they never surprised *Lee*.

## QUESTIONS

1. Write a short description of the theatre of operations.
2. Draw up a list of the forces employed on either side ; and estimate their fighting qualities.
3. Write a brief account of the operations, omitting all tactical details.
4. Brief account of the Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-7.
5. Brief account of the Battle of Spottsylvania, May 8-19.
6. State Grant's general idea, and describe his movements up to and including the Passage of the Rapidan.
7. Rough sketch maps of the Wilderness Battle on the mornings of May 5 and of May 6.
8. Describe the Wilderness Battle on May 5.
9. Describe the Wilderness Battle on May 6.
10. Tactical comments on the Wilderness Battle.
11. Rough sketch map of Spottsylvania, (1) on May 9 and 10, (2) on May 12, (3) on May 14.
12. Describe events at Spottsylvania on May 8.
13. Describe events at Spottsylvania on May 9, sketching Lee's position.
14. Describe events at Spottsylvania on May 10.
15. Describe events at Spottsylvania on May 12-13.
16. Tactical comments on Spottsylvania Battle.
17. Describe the movements of both armies from Spottsylvania to the N. Anna.
18. Rough sketch map of the N. Anna position, May 24-5.

19. Describe Sheridan's Richmond raid, May 8-24.
20. Consider the position of the combatants on the N. Anna.
21. Describe the operations of General Butler until the end of the Battle of Drury's Bluff, May 16.
22. Rough sketch map of the Totopotomoy position, May 28-9.
23. Describe the events on the Totopotomoy, May 26-31.
24. Describe events at Cold Harbour, June 1-2.
25. Rough sketch map of the Cold Harbour position, June 3.
26. Describe Grant's passage of the Chickahominy and the James, and show its great strategic importance.
27. Describe the Federal assaults on Petersburg, June 15-18, and account for their failure.
28. Describe Sheridan's raid to Trevelyian Station, June 11, and Wilson's raid against the Danville railway.
29. Give a brief account of the Shenandoah Valley operations.
30. Write notes on (1) Divided Command, (2) Command of the Sea, (3) the Passage of the James, (4) Grant's use of Artillery, (5) Night Marches.
31. Write a note on the work of the Cavalry.
32. Consider Grant's general strategic idea, especially referring to General Butler and to Generals Sigel and Hunter.
33. Consider Lee's general strategic idea.

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